United States v. Thomas Hawkins
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1191
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Two Cook County Board of Review analysts, Thomas Hawkins and John Racasi, accepted cash from Ali Haleem (an undercover police officer) to obtain lower property tax assessments; reductions occurred for most parcels.
- A jury convicted Hawkins and Racasi of violating 18 U.S.C. §666 (theft/bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds) and 18 U.S.C. §1341 (mail fraud) plus related conspiracy counts.
- Defendants argued they accepted money intending to deceive Haleem (i.e., pocket the cash) rather than to perform official acts for Cook County, and that jury instructions conflated gratuities with bribes.
- The district court instructed the jury using a Seventh Circuit definition of “corruptly” (knowledge that the payor expected influence/reward) for §666, and gave a broader bribery definition for the mail-fraud (§1341/§1346) charge that treated mere receipt of a “reward” as bribery.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed the §666 convictions (finding the instruction proper and that defendants were guilty whether payments were bribes or gratuities) but vacated the §1341 convictions because the mail-fraud instruction improperly allowed conviction for mere receipt of a gratuity in tension with Skilling.
- The court also reviewed (and rejected) defendants’ challenge to a Guidelines enhancement under U.S.S.G. §2C1.1(b)(3) for occupying a high-level/sensitive position, concluding the district court did not clearly err; sentences imposed were below Guidelines ranges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (U.S.) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper meaning of “corruptly” under §666 | Instruction requiring payee know payor expects influence/reward is correct and safeguards innocence | Defendants wanted narrower meaning requiring intent to perform an official act in exchange | Court upheld instruction: knowledge of payor’s intent plus payee’s intent to be influenced or rewarded suffices |
| Whether §666 covers gratuities (rewards) as well as bribes | §666 forbids taking gratuities or bribes; conviction valid if intended to be rewarded | Defendants argued gratuities without quid pro quo should not be criminalized as bribery | Court affirmed §666 convictions: statute covers rewards or influence intent |
| Validity of mail-fraud (§1341/§1346) instruction treating receipt of reward as bribery | Instruction mirrored §666 language and allowed conviction for reward-based bribery | Defendants argued Skilling limits §1346 to bribery/kickbacks (quid pro quo); mere gratuity receipt cannot support honest-services mail fraud | Court vacated §1341 convictions: instruction improperly allowed conviction for mere receipt of gratuity inconsistent with Skilling |
| Guidelines enhancement under U.S.S.G. §2C1.1(b)(3) for sensitive/high-level position | Analysts exercised meaningful discretion in selecting comparables; enhancement appropriate | Defendants argued analysts had ministerial duties and limited discretion | Court affirmed enhancement: factual finding that analysts had significant discretion was not clearly erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Anderson, 517 F.3d 953 (7th Cir.) (treats §666 as forbidding gratuities as well as bribes)
- United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183 (7th Cir.) (similar interpretation of §666)
- United States v. Peleti, 576 F.3d 377 (7th Cir.) (adopts Pattern Jury Instruction definition of “corruptly” for bribery statutes)
- United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167 (2d Cir.) (source for Pattern Jury Instruction definition of “corruptly”)
- Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (limits honest-services mail fraud to bribery and kickbacks; requires quid pro quo)
- United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398 (1999) (distinguishes types of permissible rewards under federal bribery provisions)