United States v. Thomas Davis, III
695 F. App'x 180
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- Thomas A. Davis, III was arrested Feb. 11, 2015 (Indianapolis) on an FBI complaint alleging a Nov. 2012 bank robbery in Muscatine, Iowa; indictment returned Mar. 17, 2015.
- Davis sought an identity hearing and detention; identity hearing was requested Feb. 17 and held Feb. 20; detention ordered Feb. 26 and transfer to Iowa arranged.
- Defense counsel turnover: a federal defender was appointed, sought to withdraw at Davis’s request; John Lane later appointed; Lane sought to withdraw; magistrate denied withdrawal and directed filing of Speedy Trial Act motion.
- Davis, through counsel, moved to dismiss the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act (claimed indictment not returned within 30 days of arrest); district court excluded four days (Feb. 17–20) as delay attributable to Davis’s identity-hearing motion and denied dismissal.
- Davis sought to proceed pro se; magistrate conducted a Faretta colloquy, found Davis knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel, granted self-representation with standby counsel; Davis represented himself at trial but was removed for disruptive behavior and trial completed; jury convicted and Davis was sentenced to life.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Davis) | Defendant's Argument (United States) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether indictment violated 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (Speedy Trial Act) because it was returned more than 30 days after arrest | Indictment was untimely (34 days elapsed); days for identity hearing and transportation should not be excluded | Days Feb. 17–20 are excludable as delay resulting from a pretrial motion under § 3161(h)(1)(D); thus indictment timely | Court affirmed: four days (Feb. 17–20) properly excluded; indictment timely returned |
| Whether Davis validly waived right to counsel and was competent to proceed pro se (Faretta) | Davis lacked understanding of rules and resources; his statements and trial performance show waiver was not knowing and he was not competent | Magistrate’s Faretta colloquy adequately warned Davis of dangers; waiver need only be knowing/intelligent, not skilled; competency to waive differs from competency to represent | Court affirmed: waiver was knowing and voluntary; no need to renew Faretta inquiry during trial |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Wearing, 837 F.3d 905 (8th Cir.) (standard of review for combined legal/factual Speedy Trial Act review)
- United States v. Moses, 15 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 1994) (pretrial motion delay includes filing and decision dates for Speedy Trial Act exclusion)
- United States v. Hohn, 8 F.3d 1301 (8th Cir. 1993) (Speedy Trial Act delay categories are not to be narrowly construed)
- United States v. Porchay, 651 F.3d 930 (8th Cir.) (pretrial-motion exclusions under § 3161(h)(1)(D) are automatically excludable without ends-of-justice findings)
- Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010) (clarifying application of Speedy Trial Act exclusions)
- United States v. Ladoucer, 373 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 2004) (standard for Faretta waiver review)
- United States v. Armstrong, 554 F.3d 1159 (8th Cir.) (Faretta waiver considerations)
- United States v. Miller, 728 F.3d 768 (8th Cir.) (competence required is competence to waive counsel, not to conduct trial)
- United States v. Tschacher, 687 F.3d 923 (8th Cir.) (distinguishing competence to waive from competence to represent oneself)
- United States v. Smith, 830 F.3d 803 (8th Cir.) (defendant may represent himself even if conduct is frivolous or leads to unfavorable outcome)