United States v. Thomas
2014 CCA LEXIS 865
| N.M.C.C.A. | 2014Background
- Incident (27–28 July 2012): PFC AA returned to barracks intoxicated and fell asleep; the appellant entered her room after his watch and engaged in sexual intercourse while she had little memory of the event.
- Appellant admissions: he told others he had sex with her, told NCIS he removed her clothes, had intercourse, and believed she was passed out; he apologized the next day.
- Charges and conviction: convicted at a general court-martial of one specification of rape and two specifications of sexual assault (acquitted of burglary and one sexual-assault specification); sentence: 3 years confinement, reduction to E‑1, forfeiture of pay, dishonorable discharge; convening authority approved.
- Procedural posture on appeal: appellant raised (1) failure to define statutory "force" element for rape by unlawful force; (2) unreasonable multiplication of charges (multiple sexual-assault convictions from one act); and (3) error in calculating Article 120 maximum punishment.
- Court holdings summary: the Court found the evidence legally insufficient to support the rape conviction and set it aside; it found the military judge abused discretion by not remedying unreasonable multiplication of charges and ordered consolidation of the two remaining sexual-assault specifications; it affirmed the sentence after reassessing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the military judge erred by not defining the statutory element "force" for rape by "unlawful force" | Government treated "unlawful force" as a standalone, lesser form of force sufficient for rape conviction | Appellant argued the judge should have defined "force" and "unlawful force" separately; conviction challenged as unsupported | Court held statutory definitions must be read together: government must prove force as defined (weapon, sufficient physical strength/violence, or physical harm to coerce) and that it was "unlawful"; rape conviction was factually insufficient and set aside (rendering the instructional issue moot) |
| Whether multiple sexual-assault specifications arising from a single sexual act were an unreasonable multiplication of charges | Prosecution charged alternate theories (sleep/unawareness and intoxication) to meet contingencies of proof and declined to concede alternatives | Appellant argued convictions for multiple specifications based on one act were duplicative and inflated criminality/exposure | Court held the two remaining sexual-assault specifications charged the same sexual act under alternative theories and should not yield separate convictions; military judge erred by only merging for sentencing—court consolidated the specifications into one |
| Whether the military judge miscalculated the maximum punishment under Article 120 | Appellant argued presidential regulations defining max punishments were not in effect, limiting exposure to summary court-martial maximums | Government relied on precedent treating Article 120 punishment as including the statutory maximums applied at trial | Court held the military judge correctly determined maximum punishment consistent with controlling precedent (Booker) and affirmed the court-martial’s sentencing authority |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394 (C.A.A.F.) (standard for factual sufficiency review)
- United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324 (C.M.A.) (test for factual sufficiency)
- United States v. Quiroz, 55 M.J. 334 (C.A.A.F.) (factors for unreasonable multiplication of charges)
- United States v. Elespuru, 73 M.J. 326 (C.A.A.F.) (when contingencies of proof require consolidation/dismissal)
- United States v. Campbell, 71 M.J. 19 (C.A.A.F.) (abuse-of-discretion review for unreasonable multiplication; weighing Quiroz factors)
- United States v. Britton, 47 M.J. 195 (C.A.A.F.) (discussion endorsing conditional dismissals to protect government interests)
- United States v. Booker, 72 M.J. 787 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.) (treatment of Article 120 punishment issues)