89 F. Supp. 3d 216
D. Mass.2015Background
- Defendant Sherad Therrien charged with five counts of distributing cocaine/cocaine base and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm based on alleged sales to a cooperating witness (Sept 2013–Mar 2014).
- Therrien alleges a prior friendship and a sexual/romantic relationship with Officer Jessica Athas (Hampden County Sheriff's Department), whom he met while incarcerated; Athas allegedly gave him her phone number after release and they remained in contact.
- Therrien claims Athas used flirtation and sexual intimacy to pressure and induce him to sell drugs and a gun to the cooperating witness, telling him it would advance her DEA career.
- Therrien moves to dismiss the indictment for "egregious government conduct" (outrageous misconduct) and requests an evidentiary hearing.
- Government disputes that the conduct meets the high due-process threshold for dismissal and contends there was no Brady suppression because Therrien knew the nature of the relationship.
- The court assumed Therrien’s allegations true for purposes of the motion, denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice, and declined to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether government conduct (use of sex/feminine wiles by an agent) is so outrageous as to require dismissal | Athas used sexual/flirtatious relationship to induce Therrien to commit crimes; this is egregious government misconduct warranting dismissal | The government’s tactics, even if involving intimacy, do not reach the rare, shocking level required to dismiss under due process | Denied — sexual inducement, as alleged, is not per se outrageous; court follows precedent permitting such tactics absent extreme facts |
| Whether nondisclosure of Athas–Therrien relationship violated Brady and warrants dismissal | Failure to disclose the relationship was a Brady violation and supports dismissal as outrageous conduct | Therrien knew the relationship; evidence was not suppressed; even a Brady violation alone does not meet outrageous-conduct standard | Denied — no suppression because defendant knew essential facts; even if Brady error occurred, it likely would not qualify as outrageous misconduct requiring dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Guzman, 282 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2002) (dismissal for government misconduct available only in rare, extreme cases)
- United States v. Luisi, 482 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2007) (due-process dismissal reserved for conduct that shocks universal sense of justice)
- United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (U.S. 1973) (framework for outrageous government conduct doctrine)
- United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1993) (doctrine may supplement entrapment where government creates or coerces crime)
- United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987) (use of sexual/intimate relationships by agents not per se unconstitutional law-enforcement tactic)
- United States v. Alverio-Melendez, 640 F.3d 412 (1st Cir. 2011) (Brady requires that evidence was suppressed by the government)
- Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003) (no suppression where defendant knew or should have known essential facts)
- United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982) (same principle on constructive knowledge and Brady)
- United States v. Urciuoli, 470 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.R.I. 2007) (Brady violations serious but dismissal is an extreme remedy reserved for rare prejudice or outrageous misconduct)