United States v. Theodore Longust
685 F. App'x 496
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Theodore J. Longust, a Business Relationship Manager at Scott Credit Union, pled guilty to multiple counts including bank fraud, misapplication of funds, money laundering, and making a false loan document arising from roughly $13.7 million in losses to the credit union.
- Over about six years Longust issued unauthorized and undocumented business loans, including approximately $1.7 million in advances to Windoor; he personally retained just under $200,000.
- The district court calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 121–151 months and sentenced Longust to 121 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.
- At sentencing Longust argued for a below-Guidelines sentence, asserting limited personal enrichment, collateral consequences for his employment prospects, and that he issued loans primarily to keep Windoor in business — claiming Windoor knew the loans were fraudulent.
- The district court acknowledged limited personal gain but emphasized the seriousness of the offense based on the credit union’s substantial losses, the scheme’s sophistication and duration, deterrence, and the victim-impact evidence; the court declined to credit Windoor’s alleged knowledge absent evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court failed to consider Longust’s intent to keep Windoor in business under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) | Government: sentence at bottom of Guidelines (121 months) appropriate given losses and breach of trust | Longust: sought below-Guidelines sentence because he primarily acted to keep Windoor afloat, not to enrich himself | Court: district court adequately considered intent and mitigation; emphasized harms and sophistication of scheme and affirmed sentence |
| Whether the district court improperly refused to consider Windoor’s alleged knowledge of the fraud | Gov: knowledge irrelevant to sentencing and 3553(a) factors | Longust: Windoor’s knowledge would make conduct less egregious and reduce need for deterrence | Court: refusal permissible because asserted knowledge did not affect defendant’s background/character and lacked evidentiary support; court may reject unsupported mitigation |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Chapman, 694 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2012) (sentencing courts may reject mitigation arguments that lack factual support)
- United States v. Diaz, 533 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2008) (district court may decline to credit unsupported factual assertions at sentencing)
