United States v. Theodore Jackson, Jr., 704 F. App'x 484

Theodore Jackson convicted of armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113), brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
Original sentence (2005): 360 months (district court applied ACCA/armed career criminal enhancement). Jackson’s § 2255 motion (after Johnson) led to vacatur and a resentencing hearing in 2016.
At resentencing the government argued Jackson should instead be a Guidelines career offender under USSG § 4B1.1; the district court agreed and calculated a Guidelines range of 262–327 months, imposing 262 months (Counts 1 & 3 concurrent) plus an 84-month consecutive § 924(c) term (total 346 months).
Jackson challenged (1) the career-offender designation under § 4B1.1 and (2) the procedural reasonableness of the sentence for failing to explain consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and denial of a downward variance.
Sixth Circuit held the career-offender designation was proper (relying on pre‑1996 Ohio robbery/aggravated robbery precedent and Supreme Court guidance in Beckles) but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing because the district court failed to adequately articulate § 3553(a) reasoning or explain rejection of the downward-variance arguments.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Jackson qualified as a career offender under USSG § 4B1.1	Government: Jackson’s prior Ohio convictions (attempted robbery and aggravated robbery) are crimes of violence under § 4B1.2(a), including the residual clause	Jackson: Pre‑1996 Ohio statutes do not qualify as crimes of violence absent the residual clause; Johnson undermines such reliance	Affirmed: Court upheld career-offender classification, applying § 4B1.2(a) as interpreted post‑Beckles and Sixth Circuit precedent (attempted robbery/aggravated robbery qualify)
Whether the sentence was procedurally reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)	Government: Sentence within Guidelines was appropriate; no further explanation required beyond selection within range	Jackson: District court failed to explain how § 3553(a) factors were considered or why it denied a downward variance; record lacks reasons for the chosen sentence	Vacated: Court found an abuse of discretion—district court did not articulate reasons or address the defense variance arguments; remanded for resentencing

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (Sup. Ct. 2015) (ACCA residual clause held unconstitutionally vague)
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (Guidelines’ residual clause not subject to vagueness challenge)
United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2016) (applied Johnson to Sentencing Guidelines residual clause)
United States v. Sanders, 470 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2006) (pre‑1996 Ohio aggravated robbery poses serious risk and qualifies under residual clause)
United States v. Mansur, [citation="375 F. App'x 458"] (6th Cir. 2010) (pre‑1996 Ohio attempted robbery qualifies as violent felony/crime of violence)
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (requirements for sentencing explanation to permit meaningful appellate review)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (procedural-reasonableness standards for sentencing)
United States v. Thomas, 498 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 2007) (vacatur where district court failed to meaningfully address § 3553(a) factors)
United States v. Penson, 526 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 2008) (vacatur for inadequate § 3553(a) explanation)
United States v. Brooks, 628 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2011) (sentencing explanation must permit meaningful appellate review)
United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004) (preservation rule for sentencing objections)