United States v. Terys Boose
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 860
| 8th Cir. | 2014Background
- Boose pleaded guilty to one count of distributing cocaine base; one count dismissed; sentenced to 120 months after district court found him a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).
- District court treated an Arkansas first‑degree battery conviction (Ark. Code Ann. § 5‑13‑201(a)(3)) as a qualifying "crime of violence," producing a Guidelines range of 188–235 months before a downward variance.
- The parties disputed whether the Arkansas first‑degree battery conviction qualified as a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines' force clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(1)) or residual clause (§ 4B1.2(a)(2)).
- Arkansas § 5‑13‑201(a)(3) criminalizes causing serious physical injury under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life; Arkansas law permits a conviction under that subsection based on reckless conduct.
- The Eighth Circuit applied the modified categorical approach and analyzed whether a conviction under subsection (3) necessarily involved purposeful/knowing force (the force clause) or was sufficiently similar in kind and degree of risk to the enumerated offenses (the residual clause).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Boose) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ark. § 5‑13‑201(a)(3) is a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines' force clause | Boose: The statute allows conviction based on recklessness, so it lacks the purposeful use of force required by the force clause | Gov't: The statute's element (extreme indifference causing serious injury) reflects violent, aggressive conduct qualifying under the force clause | The statute can be violated by reckless conduct; it is not categorically a crime of violence under the force clause |
| Whether subsection (3) qualifies under the Guidelines' residual clause | Boose: Reckless, nonpurposeful conduct (e.g., reckless driving/ DUI) is not similar in kind/degree to enumerated offenses | Gov't: The extreme‑indifference element creates a serious risk of physical injury akin to enumerated offenses | Subsection (3) is not similar in kind and degree to the enumerated crimes and thus fails the residual clause |
| Whether Boose qualifies as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 | Boose: Lacks two prior crimes of violence because the first‑degree battery conviction does not qualify | Gov't: First‑degree battery counts as a predicate crime of violence | Court: Boose is not a career offender because the battery conviction is not a crime of violence |
| Remedy: Whether remand is required and whether the government may expand the record on remand | Boose: Requests resentencing without career‑offender enhancement | Gov't: Might seek to reprove predicate status | Court: Vacates sentence and remands for resentencing; government may not expand the record because it already had full opportunity to present evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (residual clause requires showing of purposeful, violent, aggressive conduct)
- Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (categorical approach focuses on statutory elements, not underlying facts)
- United States v. Ossana, 638 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 2011) (reckless vehicle use is not a crime of violence under force or residual clauses)
- United States v. Dawn, 685 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2012) (Arkansas second‑degree battery subsection allowing recklessness is not a crime of violence under force clause)
- United States v. Roblero‑Ramirez, 716 F.3d 1122 (8th Cir. 2013) (modified categorical approach applies where state statute is overbroad)
- United States v. Vincent, 575 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2009) (statutes with purposeful/knowing/reckless mental states may qualify under residual clause when risk resembles enumerated offenses)