Background

• In January 2010, two Deputy U.S. Marshals knocked on Sabo's trailer door seeking a fugitive; odor of marijuana and voices inside were noted.
• Sabo opened the door, denied the fugitive was there, and shut the door after using an expletive directed at the deputies.
• Detective McCune, who knew Sabo, knocked and asked to step inside; Sabo allowed entry by stepping aside and not verbally objecting.
• McCune entered, detected marijuana odors, observed firearms, and secured the guns while obtaining a search warrant for marijuana.
• Sabo was indicted for possession with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm; he moved to suppress the evidence, which the district court denied; he reserved appellate rights.
• The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Sabo’s nonverbal conduct constituted implied consent to enter and thus the entry was lawful.

Issues

Key Cases Cited

• Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (unreasonable warrantless entry into the home is the chief evil the Fourth Amendment guards against)
• Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent must be voluntary and can be implied or verbal)
• United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1976) (consent can be implied from conduct; totality of circumstances used to assess voluntariness)
• Harney v. City of Chi., 702 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2012) (conduct like opening a door with an opportunity for entry can demonstrate consent)
• United States v. Risner, 593 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2010) (implied consent is a factual question assessed under totality of circumstances)
• United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2000) (opening a door and allowing entry can show consent)
• Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2001) (nonverbal acts can constitute consent to entry)