970 F.3d 523
4th Cir.2020Background
- Terry and Brenda Millender ran two fundraising/investment ventures (Micro-Enterprise Management Group and Kingdom Commodities) that solicited parishioner and investor funds but diverted most proceeds to personal use and risky trading rather than stated microlending/oil deals.
- Grenetta Wells, a cooperating former COO with a prior money‑laundering conviction, testified that she, Terry, and Brenda discussed and agreed to conceal losses and not warn lenders; Wells also testified Brenda approved certain withdrawals.
- A jury convicted Brenda on seven counts (conspiracy to commit wire fraud, three substantive money‑laundering counts, and conspiracy to commit money laundering); the district court nonetheless granted Brenda a Rule 29 judgment of acquittal on all seven counts and conditionally ordered a new trial.
- The Government appealed the acquittal; the Fourth Circuit reviewed sufficiency of evidence de novo and reviewed the new‑trial decision for abuse of discretion.
- The Fourth Circuit reinstated the convictions for the two conspiracy counts and the three concealment money‑laundering counts (reversing the judgment of acquittal), vacated the conditional new‑trial order for lack of specific reasoning, and remanded for further proceedings; Terry’s cross‑appeal was dismissed and his case remanded following his death.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that Brenda knew of the fraud (knowledge element for conspiracies) | Government: Wells’s corroborated testimony and circumstantial evidence allowed a reasonable jury to infer Brenda’s knowledge and willful joining of conspiracies | Brenda/district court: Evidence did not show Brenda conceived, understood, or knowingly joined any fraudulent scheme | Reversed district court; Wells’s testimony, viewed in Government’s favor, could support jury finding of Brenda’s knowledge and guilt on conspiracy counts |
| Sufficiency of evidence for concealment money‑laundering (§1956(a)(1)(B)(i)) | Government: Checks bearing false purposes could conceal the nature (not just source) of illicit proceeds, permitting a jury to find intent to disguise proceeds | Brenda/district court: Payments were merely spending of proceeds on personal expenses and did not conceal source or otherwise show intent to disguise | Reversed district court; false descriptions on checks could reasonably be found to conceal the nature of proceeds, sustaining three concealment convictions |
| Conditional grant of a new trial (weight‑of‑evidence basis) | Government: District court erred by not specifying reasons and by improperly substituting its judgment for the jury without adequate explanation | Brenda/district court: Court found weight of evidence favored acquittal and thus conditionally ordered a new trial if acquittal was reversed | Vacated conditional new‑trial order; remanded because district court failed to specify reasons required by Rule 29(d)(1) and did not explain its exercise of discretion |
| Procedural effect of Terry’s death and cross‑appeal | Government: Does not oppose dismissal/remand; Brenda’s appeal proceeds unaffected | Terry (via counsel): Move to dismiss cross‑appeal and vacate convictions/sentence due to death; district court had sentenced him during Government’s appeal | Court granted dismissal of Terry’s cross‑appeal and remanded Terry’s judgment to district court to address abatement issues; Terry’s death did not affect Brenda’s appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (criminal knowledge may be proved circumstantially)
- United States v. Burfoot, 899 F.3d 326 (4th Cir.) (knowledge requirement for wire‑fraud conspiracy)
- United States v. Blair, 661 F.3d 755 (4th Cir.) (knowledge element for concealment laundering statutes)
- United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212 (4th Cir.) (uncorroborated accomplice testimony can sustain conviction; appellate courts defer to jury credibility findings)
- United States v. Farrell, 921 F.3d 116 (4th Cir.) (elements of concealment money laundering under §1956)
- United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360 (4th Cir.) (distinction between ordinary spending and laundering by concealment)
- United States v. Garcia‑Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir.) (example where mere spending without concealment failed to support laundering conviction)
- United States v. Arrington, 757 F.2d 1484 (4th Cir.) (new‑trial standard; courts should exercise discretion sparingly)
- United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267 (6th Cir.) (district courts must explain reasons when conditionally granting a new trial)