United States v. Terrence Bell, 575 F. App'x 598

Terrence Bell pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute; no written plea agreement.
The PSR classified Bell as an Armed Career Criminal under the ACCA (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) based on one aggravated robbery and two Tennessee aggravated-assault convictions, triggering a 15-year mandatory minimum for the firearm count.
Bell challenged only whether one aggravated-assault conviction under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(c) qualified as a “violent felony” under the ACCA.
§ 39-13-102(c) (2006) punishes intentionally or knowingly causing or attempting bodily injury or committing/attempting an assault against a person protected by a court order, diversion, or probation agreement; Tennessee’s definition of “assault” includes (1) intentional/knowing/reckless bodily injury, (2) causing reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury, or (3) intentionally/knowingly offensive physical contact.
The district court held the Tennessee aggravated-assault offense categorically qualifies under the ACCA residual clause and sentenced Bell to 180 months; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a conviction under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(c) is a "violent felony" under the ACCA residual clause	Bell: the statute encompasses reckless/simple assault conduct (and minor offensive contact), so it does not categorically present a serious potential risk of physical injury	Government: the statute requires intentional/knowing conduct and, because violations occur despite a restraining order, the offense poses a serious risk of physical injury similar to enumerated offenses	Held: § 39-13-102(c) is categorically a violent felony under the ACCA residual clause; sentence affirmed
Whether the court must apply the modified categorical approach or can treat § 39-13-102(c) as categorically disqualifying	Bell: statute is divisible or broad enough to require examining underlying records	Government: statute categorically presents sufficient risk so modified approach not needed	Held: modified categorical approach not needed because the statute categorically meets the residual-clause risk standard

Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (defines residual-clause similarity test focusing on "purposeful, violent, and aggressive" conduct)
Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011) (frames residual-clause analysis around comparability of risk to enumerated offenses)
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (assesses risk in burglary by focusing on confrontation risk)
United States v. Mitchell, 743 F.3d 1054 (6th Cir. 2014) (interprets Tennessee offenses and applies Begay/Sykes framework)
United States v. Perry, 703 F.3d 906 (6th Cir. 2013) (explains that crimes requiring purposeful infliction or attempt of serious physical injury present requisite ACCA risk)
United States v. Johnson, 707 F.3d 655 (6th Cir. 2013) (analyzes statutes criminalizing offensive contact and stalking under the residual clause)