United States v. Terrell Banker, 876 F.3d 530

Background

In early 2015, Defendant Terrell Banker befriended C.O., who was 17 at the time; C.O. sometimes misrepresented her age online as 18 and did not directly tell Banker she was a minor.
Banker supplied drugs to C.O. and sometimes accepted sex as payment; Cook (mutual friend) suggested C.O. prostitute and discussed this with Banker.
Cook told Banker (within earshot of C.O.) that C.O. was 17; days later Banker arranged for C.O. to have sex with a truck driver for payment and drove her to the meeting.
Police interrupted the encounter; C.O. told police and then told Banker she had been held as a runaway and that she was a minor; Banker did not expressly acknowledge that statement.
Banker was indicted for conspiracy and sex trafficking of a minor (18 U.S.C. § 1591/1594) and enticement of a minor (18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)); the district court instructed the jury that §1591(age) could be proved by knowledge or reckless disregard, and §2422(b) did not require proof that the defendant knew the victim was a minor.
The jury convicted on all counts; Banker appealed challenging the mens rea instructions and sufficiency of evidence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Banker)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether §1591(a) requires proof the defendant actually knew victim was <18 (versus knowledge or reckless disregard)	§1591’s minors clause requires actual knowledge; reckless-disregard language applies only to force clause; ambiguity favors defendant under lenity	The statute’s grammar and punctuation permit either knowledge or reckless disregard to apply to both force and age clauses; jury instruction correct	The court affirmed: §1591(a) may be satisfied by knowledge or reckless disregard of victim’s age
Whether §2422(b) requires proof defendant knew victim was a minor	Flores‑Figueroa’s rule should extend to §2422(b): “knowingly” modifies both verb and direct object (victim’s age)	Prior 4th Cir. precedent interpreting identical language in §2423(a) controls; special context (protecting minors) means knowledge of age is not required	The court held Flores‑Figueroa does not compel a different result; §2422(b) does not require proof defendant knew victim was <18
Whether holding §2422(b) as not requiring knowledge of age creates overlap with §2422(a) or improper strict liability	Must require knowledge to avoid duplicative/overbroad application and to protect against conviction when defendant mistakenly communicates with an adult	Statutory differences (jurisdictional hooks and penalties) and congressional purpose to protect minors justify treating age as an element not requiring defendant’s knowledge	The court rejected the overlap/strict‑liability concern as insufficient to change interpretation
Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove knowledge or reckless disregard of C.O.’s age	Evidence insufficient because C.O. lied about age online and did not directly tell Banker; no clear audible response when Cook told Banker C.O. was 17	Testimony that Cook told Banker C.O. was 17, plus repeated in‑person contact, access to her Facebook, knowledge she attended high school and was a runaway, supported finding of knowledge or reckless disregard	The court held the evidence was sufficient; jury could credit testimony that Banker was told C.O. was 17 and could infer reckless disregard

Key Cases Cited

Flores‑Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (statute’s “knowingly” may modify subsequent elements but context can alter application)
United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938 (4th Cir. 2014) (knowledge of victim’s age not required under similarly worded §2423(a); special context protects minors)
United States v. Daniels, 685 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2012) ( §2422(b) need not require knowledge of victim’s age; endorses protecting minors over imposing higher proof burden)
United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2012) ( §2422(b) designed to protect children; context supports not requiring knowledge of age)
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (reckless disregard standard described for civil/criminal contexts)
United States v. Baker, 985 F.2d 1248 (4th Cir. 1993) (uncorroborated testimony of accomplice can sustain conviction)