United States v. Terrance Shaw, 957 F.3d 734

Background:

Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act (2010) to raise the crack‑cocaine quantity thresholds triggering mandatory penalties, but its changes initially applied only to post‑August 3, 2010 sentences.
The First Step Act (2018) made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive for certain defendants and allows a district court to "impose a reduced sentence as if" the Fair Sentencing Act had been in effect when the offense was committed (for "covered offenses").
Four defendants (Shaw, Robinson, Grier, Foulks) convicted of pre‑2010 crack offenses moved under §404(b) of the First Step Act for sentence reductions; district courts denied relief as they concluded defendants were not "covered offenses."
Central disagreement: defendants argued eligibility depends only on the statute of conviction (i.e., whether the statutory penalties were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act); the government argued courts must consider the offense‑specific drug quantity (PSR/plea facts) to determine eligibility.
Seventh Circuit held that "covered offense" is determined by the statute of conviction (not case‑specific quantities), reversed the denials for all four, and remanded; it also ruled the district court gave an inadequate alternative explanation for denying Robinson relief and remanded his case for fuller consideration.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. What does "covered offense" mean under the First Step Act?	Eligibility is statutory: examine only the statute of conviction to see if the Fair Sentencing Act modified its penalties.	Eligibility requires fact‑intensive inquiry into the offense (drug quantity in PSR/plea).	The modifier applies to the "Federal criminal statute." Eligibility depends on statute of conviction, not drug quantity.
2. Were these defendants convicted of "covered offenses"?	Each was convicted under crack statutes whose penalties were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, so each is covered.	Based on reported quantities (all above the Fair Sentencing Act thresholds), defendants are not eligible.	Each defendant’s statute of conviction was modified by the Fair Sentencing Act; all are eligible to seek relief.
3. May district courts consider §3553(a) factors and post‑sentencing conduct when deciding whether to reduce a sentence?	Courts may and should consider §3553(a) factors and post‑sentencing rehabilitation in exercising discretion.	(Implicit) relief is discretionary and subject to usual limits; government noted district court discretion.	Nothing in the First Step Act bars consideration of §3553(a) factors or post‑sentencing conduct; courts may use the familiar §3553(a) framework (but whether it is required was left open).
4. Was the district court’s alternative denial of Robinson’s motion harmless error?	Robinson: the court failed to address his arguments (pre‑ and post‑sentence reasons) or the government’s recommendation and gave an inadequate explanation.	Government: alternative ruling shows error on eligibility was harmless.	The alternative ruling lacked sufficient explanation to be harmless; remand required so the court can fully consider Robinson’s arguments.

Key Cases Cited

Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (recognizing Fair Sentencing Act’s purpose and disparate impact rationale)
Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (canon favoring modifier applies to nearest reasonable referent)
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (discussing when statutory "committed before" language implies fact‑specific inquiry)
Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958 (statutory canons may be overcome by broader statutory context)
Chavez‑Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959 (district court must provide adequate explanation for sentencing decisions)
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (post‑sentencing rehabilitation may inform §3553(a) analysis)
United States v. Smith, 954 F.3d 446 (1st Cir. interpretation that First Step Act modifier applies to statute)
United States v. Jackson, 945 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. adopting statute‑based eligibility approach)
United States v. McDonald, 944 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. similar statutory‑referent reading)
United States v. Beamus, 943 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. agreeing on statutory referent)
United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. same interpretation)
United States v. Miller, 883 F.3d 998 (7th Cir.: standard of review is de novo for statutory interpretation)
United States v. Foster, 701 F.3d 1142 (requirement that alternate rulings be fully explained)
United States v. Hill, 645 F.3d 900 (same principle on need for meaningful explanation)
United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d 660 (harmless‑error considerations in sentencing contexts)
United States v. Currie, 739 F.3d 960 (on review of sentencing explanations)