951 F.3d 1138
9th Cir.2020Background
- In 2008 Jones pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to 18 years after the district court applied the ACCA mandatory-minimum based on three prior violent-felony convictions.
- One predicate was a 1990 Colorado conviction for second-degree burglary of a dwelling under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-203(2)(a).
- Jones filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion claiming actual innocence of his ACCA sentence, arguing his Colorado burglary conviction did not qualify as a "violent felony" under the ACCA and the modified categorical approach.
- The district court found the § 2255 motion time-barred but stated it agreed with Jones on the merits that the Colorado burglary did not qualify; it issued a certificate of appealability on whether actual-innocence can overcome procedural default for a statutorily ineligible sentence.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo, held that Colorado second-degree burglary of a dwelling matches the federal generic burglary definition (as clarified in Stitt), concluded the conviction is an ACCA violent felony, and affirmed the denial of § 2255 relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an asserted claim of actual innocence permits overcoming the § 2255 one-year time bar/procedural default | Jones: actual innocence of the ACCA sentence allows pursuit of § 2255 despite procedural default | Government: motion is time-barred and procedural default applies | Not reached on the merits — the court resolved the appeal by holding the predicate conviction qualified as a violent felony |
| Whether Colorado second-degree burglary of a dwelling qualifies as "burglary" (a violent felony) under the ACCA using the modified categorical approach | Jones: Colorado's statutory definitions are broader than generic burglary (e.g., include vehicles not adapted for overnight use) so it is not a predicate | Government: the statute's "dwelling" definition limits the offense to structures/vehicles adapted and used for habitation, aligning with generic burglary post-Stitt | Held for Government: Colorado burglary of a dwelling is within the generic burglary definition (Stitt), so it counts as an ACCA violent felony |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (explains modified categorical approach and divisibility/elements analysis)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (defines generic burglary as unlawful entry or remaining in a building or other structure with intent to commit a crime)
- United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018) (clarifies that generic burglary's "building or other structure" can include vehicles adapted for overnight use)
- United States v. Swisher, 811 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (standard of de novo review for § 2255 legal claims)
- Mutee v. United States, 920 F.3d 624 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (interprets Stitt’s requirement that nonpermanent structures be adapted for overnight accommodation)