United States v. Terrance C. Jackson
852 F.3d 764
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- On March 27, 2014, Terrance C. Jackson stabbed Gerald Smith to death on the Fort Berthold Reservation; Jackson admitted stabbing Smith but claimed self‑defense and was convicted by a jury of second‑degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon.
- Jackson was arrested hours after the killing, given Miranda warnings, and later questioned at the jail; he twice invoked his right to counsel during that interview but made several statements (drug use, lack of sleep, and “I don’t know” as to when he last cut his hair) which the district court admitted.
- At trial Jackson sought to introduce extensive prior‑acts and reputation evidence of Smith’s violence to support self‑defense; the district court admitted some incidents but excluded others as either insufficiently proven, cumulative, or unduly prejudicial.
- Jackson requested the ability to make a surrebuttal closing argument (challenging Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.1 as unconstitutional as applied); the district court denied the request pretrial and again at closing.
- At sentencing Jackson sought continuances and downward variances based on victim provocation (USSG §5K2.10), an anticipated Guidelines amendment affecting career‑offender status, and a mental‑health evaluation; the court rejected the continuance and denied variances and departures and imposed 480 months’ imprisonment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Jackson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Suppression — Were post‑arrest jailroom questions after invocation of counsel interrogation under Miranda/Edwards? | Questions were routine, health‑related, or responses to volunteered statements and therefore not interrogation; statements admissible. | Officers continued to question after Jackson invoked counsel; follow‑ups (esp. haircut question) were designed to elicit incriminating responses and should be suppressed. | Court affirmed denial of suppression for most statements (volunteered drug/sleep comments and limited health questions permissible); held the haircut question was interrogation and admission was error but harmless. |
| 2) Evidentiary rulings — Did district court abuse discretion excluding certain prior‑acts/reputation evidence of victim’s violence? | Exclusions were proper where offers of proof were insufficient, evidence cumulative, remote, or risked mini‑trials; court admitted key prior violent acts. | Sought admission of multiple prior violent acts and reputation testimony to support self‑defense; argued exclusions deprived him of defense. | Court held district court did not abuse discretion: some items properly excluded for lack of proof or remoteness or cumulative nature; exclusion of 2006 stabbing permissible under Rule 403. |
| 3) Closing order — Does Rule 29.1 (government rebuttal last) violate due process; entitlement to surrebuttal? | Rule 29.1 is a uniform practice; rebuttal does not permit new matters and defendant had ample chance to respond; preclusion of surrebuttal proper absent showing gov’t raised new matters. | Requested surrebuttal because self‑defense places burden on defendant and rebuttal gives government unfair last word. | Court rejected constitutional challenge and affirmed denial of surrebuttal; defendant never renewed motion or identified new matters requiring reply. |
| 4) Sentencing — Did court err by denying continuance for mental evaluation, refusing §5K2.10 variance, or failing to account for forthcoming Guidelines amendment? | Court considered and rejected requested variance and continuance; upcoming amendment did not change defendant’s Guidelines range and no plain or reversible error. | Sought continuance to obtain psychological evaluation, downward variance for victim provocation, and variance for pending Guidelines amendment affecting career‑offender status. | Court affirmed: no abuse of discretion or plain error — court considered §5K2.10 and amendment, found provocation insufficient, denied continuance as not compelling and not prejudicial. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (statement that volunteered statements are not Miranda products)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (once invoked, right to counsel bars further interrogation absent initiation by suspect)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (definition of interrogation and the functional‑equivalent test)
- Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (analysis of statement categories and custodial interrogation)
- United States v. Byrd, 834 F.2d 145 (8th Cir.) (Rule 29.1 and surrebuttal argument analysis)
- United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947 (8th Cir.) (question tying a suspect to a crime can be interrogation when officers have corroborating information)
- United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (harmless‑error review in criminal cases)
