United States v. Terazze Taylor, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7300

Background

Taylor was arrested for fraudulently obtaining ~$16,599 from the VA by submitting false travel-voucher information. He was released on a pretrial appearance bond with standard conditions.
Taylor was later implicated in an alleged domestic-violence incident; state charges were dismissed without prejudice, but federal authorities arrested him for violating his appearance bond, prompting a bond-revocation hearing.
At the revocation hearing, an independent eyewitness and police officers testified that Taylor assaulted the victim; Taylor and the victim (Ness) denied the assault. GPS data contradicted Taylor’s account.
The magistrate judge found by a preponderance that Taylor committed the assault and revoked his bond, discrediting Taylor’s testimony on key points.
At sentencing on the VA-fraud conviction, the district court applied a two-level U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 obstruction enhancement based on Taylor’s false testimony at the bond-revocation hearing; Taylor appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether false testimony at a bond-revocation hearing can support a § 3C1.1 obstruction enhancement	Government: yes — revocation proceedings are part of the prosecution of the instant offense and false testimony can obstruct that prosecution	Taylor: no — the revocation hearing was collateral and unrelated to the substance of his fraud offense, so § 3C1.1 does not apply	Yes. The court held revocation proceedings are part of the prosecution; materially false testimony there can support § 3C1.1
Whether the false statements were "related to" the offense of conviction	Government: related because they affected detention and prosecution logistics for the instant case	Taylor: unrelated because statements concerned a separate domestic-violence matter and not the fraud offense itself	Held related: § 3C1.1 does not require substantive nexus to the charged offense, only relation to its investigation/prosecution
Whether the testimony was "material" under § 3C1.1 comment 4(F)	Government: material because believed testimony could influence detention decision	Taylor: not material because it didn’t pertain to the fraud charge	Held material: testimony could affect custodial status pending trial, so it was material
Whether the district court made adequate findings of willfulness (mens rea) for the enhancement absent an explicit perjury finding	Government: the court can infer willfulness from credibility findings and record	Taylor: without an explicit perjury finding, willfulness is not established	Held willfulness adequately found: district court made independent findings that Taylor willfully lied to influence custody, not the result of confusion or mistake

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Shetty, 130 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir. 1997) (standard of review: de novo for characterization, clear error for facts)
United States v. Magana-Guerrero, 80 F.3d 398 (9th Cir. 1996) (false statements to pretrial services may warrant § 3C1.1 enhancement)
United States v. Benitez, 34 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding enhancement for false info to pretrial services that impeded prosecution)
United States v. Hernandez-Ramirez, 254 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2001) (no requirement that obstructive conduct be substantively related to charged offense)
United States v. Verdin, 243 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2001) (false statements to probation/pretrial officers can support enhancement)
United States v. O’Dell, 204 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2000) (upheld § 3C1.1 where perjurious testimony at revocation hearing was material)
United States v. Crousore, 1 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 1993) (test for obstruction is relation to investigation/prosecution, not subject matter of falsehood)
Dunnigan v. United States, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) (perjury requires willful false testimony; district court must make independent findings to apply obstruction enhancement)
United States v. Lofton, 905 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1990) (willfulness requires conscious intent to obstruct)