United States v. Tenorio
809 F.3d 1126
10th Cir.2015Background
- Daniel Tenorio was investigated for sexual contact with his 16-year-old niece; he denied the allegations during BIA interviews.
- Tenorio voluntarily took a polygraph administered by an FBI examiner; examiner suspected deception, confronted him, and Tenorio then confessed and wrote an apology letter.
- Indicted on two counts of knowingly engaging in sexual contact; district court denied Tenorio’s pretrial suppression motion contesting voluntariness of confession.
- Government moved in limine to allow polygraph testimony if Tenorio asserted coercion or attacked the investigation; district court initially excluded polygraph evidence but reserved ruling if Tenorio opened the door at trial.
- On direct exam Tenorio testified his confession was coerced and that the agent wouldn’t believe his denials; the government cross‑examined to show he voluntarily took a polygraph (but results were not admitted).
- Jury convicted on both counts; Tenorio appealed, arguing admission of polygraph-related testimony violated Rule 403 and the limiting instruction was improper.
Issues
| Issue | Tenorio's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of polygraph evidence after Tenorio testified his confession was coerced | Admission was unfairly prejudicial under Fed. R. Evid. 403; district court failed to properly weigh prejudice | Tenorio opened the door by asserting coercion; limited testimony about taking the polygraph is admissible to rebut that claim | Court held Tenorio opened the door; limited polygraph testimony (not results) was admissible and Rule 403 balancing was proper |
| Scope of permissible polygraph evidence | Any reference to polygraph risks unfair prejudice and inference of guilt | Only facts surrounding the voluntary polygraph to explain agents’ conduct were offered; results excluded | Court allowed testimony that Tenorio voluntarily took the polygraph and that it motivated the examiner’s confrontation; results excluded |
| Whether rebuttal use of polygraph requires Daubert/expert foundation | Polygraph evidence undermining credibility should trigger Daubert analysis and be treated as expert proof of truthfulness | Where used only to explain investigative conduct (not to prove truth), Daubert/Rule 702 is inapplicable | Court held rebuttal, limited-use testimony need not undergo Daubert when not offered to prove truthfulness |
| Jury instruction regarding polygraph testimony | Instruction mentioning polygraph invited jurors to infer failure and thus guilt | Instruction properly limited consideration to explaining agents’ actions, not defendant’s guilt | Instruction approved as correctly stating law and protecting against misuse by jury |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Hall, 805 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1986) (polygraph evidence admissible to rebut claims about investigative techniques/coercion)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (standards for admissibility of expert scientific testimony)
- United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402 (10th Cir. 1997) (explaining Daubert’s effect on prior per se rules about polygraph evidence)
- United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2009) (polygraph testimony admissible for limited rebuttal purposes when defendant alleges coercion)
- United States v. Allard, 464 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2006) (polygraph evidence exempt from Rule 702 when used to rebut confession-coercion claims)
- United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1987) (polygraph evidence may rebut assertion of coerced confession)
- United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1979) (unfair to allow defendant’s coercion story without permitting government to show polygraph’s role in precipitating confession)