United States v. Teaupa
1:12-cr-01128
D. Haw.Dec 21, 2017Background
- Defendant-petitioner Uiki Teaupa filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (failure to move to dismiss the superseding indictment, to dispute methamphetamine quantity at sentencing, to seek acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, and to appeal lack of a government substantial-assistance motion).
- The district court denied Teaupa’s § 2255 motion and a certificate of appealability on December 12, 2016; the Ninth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability and rehearing.
- Teaupa then filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion claiming the district court erred by not permitting discovery and by not holding an evidentiary hearing on his § 2255 motion.
- The district court analyzed whether the Rule 60(b) filing constituted a true Rule 60(b) motion or a second/successive § 2255 petition under Gonzalez and Ninth Circuit precedent.
- The court concluded Teaupa’s complaints about lack of an evidentiary hearing and lack of discovery attacked the merits of the § 2255 ruling (i.e., constituted "claims") and therefore were a second or successive § 2255 petition.
- Because a second or successive § 2255 petition must be authorized by the court of appeals, the district court referred Teaupa’s Rule 60(b) motion to the Ninth Circuit under Ninth Circuit Rule 22-3(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Teaupa's Rule 60(b) motion is a proper Rule 60(b) motion or a second/successive § 2255 petition | Teaupa argued the court denied procedural rights (discovery and evidentiary hearing) and sought Rule 60(b) relief from the final judgment | The government argued the motion actually attacks the merits of the § 2255 decision and thus is a successive § 2255 petition requiring appellate authorization | Court held the motion raises merits "claims" and is a second/successive § 2255 petition; referred to Ninth Circuit |
| Whether Teaupa was entitled to discovery or an evidentiary hearing in his § 2255 proceeding | Teaupa contended the court should have allowed discovery and held an evidentiary hearing | Government noted discovery in § 2255 proceedings is discretionary (Rule 6) and Teaupa never requested discovery; court discretion permits denying hearings when the record conclusively shows no relief | Court held no automatic right to discovery; denial of a hearing was a merits determination and not a defect in the integrity of the proceeding, so these complaints are treated as § 2255 claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (distinguishes Rule 60(b) procedural defects from merits-based § 2254/§2255 claims)
- Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950) (standard for extraordinary circumstances under Rule 60(b))
- United States v. Washington, 653 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir.) (2011) (Rule 60(b) motions challenging lack of evidentiary hearing are merits attacks and constitute successive petitions)
- In re Lindsey, 582 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2009) (challenging denial of evidentiary hearing constitutes a claim on the merits)
- Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977) (standard for when an evidentiary hearing is required in collateral attacks)
- United States v. Mejia-Mesa, 153 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 1998) (district court may deny an evidentiary hearing when files and records conclusively show movant not entitled to relief)
- United States v. Rodrigues, 347 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (movant must allege specific facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief)
- United States v. Buenrostro, 638 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 2011) (Gonzalez principles apply to § 2255 proceedings)
