884 F.3d 726
7th Cir.2018Background
- Defendant Omarr Teague pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm; probation recommended base offense level 14.
- Government argued Teague's prior Illinois conviction for second-degree murder was a "crime of violence," which would raise the base level to 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
- The district court ruled second-degree murder under Illinois law was not a crime of violence because it can encompass negligent or accidental killing, and imposed a 21-month sentence based on a lower Guidelines range.
- Government appealed only the district court's legal conclusion about whether Illinois second-degree murder is a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.
- Seventh Circuit reviewed the issue de novo, noting an incorrect Guidelines computation requires resentencing unless the court would have imposed the same sentence regardless (which did not occur here).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Illinois second-degree murder is a "crime of violence" under the elements clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 | Second-degree murder requires intentional or knowing use of force (derives from first-degree murder), so it qualifies. | District court: statute's "negligently or accidentally causes" language shows it need not require intentional or knowing force, so it does not qualify. | Held: Elements clause satisfied—second-degree murder incorporates first-degree murder's intent/knowledge element and is a crime of violence. |
| Whether Illinois second-degree murder is a "crime of violence" under the enumerated-offenses clause (murder or voluntary manslaughter) | The offense matches the generic definitions of murder or voluntary manslaughter (murder plus mitigating circumstances / manslaughter under extreme emotional disturbance). | Implicit defense: the offense's statutory language diverges from the generic definitions. | Held: Fits the generic definition of manslaughter (historically renamed from voluntary manslaughter), so it is an enumerated crime of violence. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (defining "elements" as the legal components the prosecution must prove)
- Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing elements and enumerated-offense clauses in § 4B1.2)
- United States v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2009) (sentence based on incorrect Guidelines range requires vacatur unless court would have imposed same sentence)
- United States v. Edwards, 836 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2016) (standard of de novo review for legal questions about Guidelines)
- People v. Thompson, 313 Ill. App. 3d 510 (Ill. App. Ct.) (explaining transferred intent: intent to kill one person supports murder conviction for unintended victim)