United States v. Taylor
596 U.S. 845
SCOTUS2022Background
- Justin Taylor participated in an attempted Hobbs Act robbery (an interstate robbery); his accomplice shot the victim. Taylor pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act attempt/conspiracy and to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (using a firearm in relation to a "crime of violence").
- The District Court sentenced Taylor to 30 years (including a consecutive § 924(c) sentence). He later sought habeas relief, arguing his § 924(c) conviction could not stand after this Court’s decision in United States v. Davis (which struck § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause).
- The government maintained the § 924(c) conviction survived because attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) (the elements clause).
- The Fourth Circuit held attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify under the elements clause and vacated the § 924(c) conviction; other circuits had reached the opposite conclusion.
- The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit: applying the categorical approach, attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not "have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force," because intent and a substantial step do not require proof of use/attempt/threat of force.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (U.S.) | Defendant's Argument (Taylor) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) (elements clause) | Attempt qualifies because completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence and attempt should be included | Attempt lacks an element requiring proof of use/attempted use/threat of force; intent and substantial step alone are not enough | No — attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify under § 924(c)(3)(A) because no element requires use/attempt/threat of force |
| Whether the elements clause sweeps in attempts to commit crimes of violence | Elements clause covers attempts to commit offenses that are themselves crimes of violence | Elements clause asks whether the predicate offense itself "has as an element" force; Congress did not say it covers attempts expressly | Rejected — elements clause requires the predicate offense to itself include force as an element; it does not automatically include attempts |
| Whether the "substantial step" element categorically requires threatened/use/attempted force | A substantial step toward robbery necessarily poses an objective (even uncommunicated) threat of force, so it should count | Substantial step does not always require that the defendant used, attempted, or threatened force; some attempts are aborted before any threat or force is communicated or used | Rejected — substantial-step element does not categorically require proof of use/attempt/threat of force |
| Whether courts may look to typical means of prosecution (empirical/prosecutorial practice) under the categorical test (relying on Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez) | Most prosecutions prove communicated threats/force; court should consider how the offense is normally prosecuted | Categorical approach forbids inquiry into how individual defendants or typical prosecutions proceed; statute asks about elements, not prosecutorial habits | Rejected — categorical approach controls; § 924(c)(3)(A) asks whether the statute’s elements themselves require force, not how prosecutions typically proceed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. _ (2019) (held § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
- Resendiz-Ponce v. United States, 549 U.S. 102 (2007) (elements of criminal attempt: intent plus substantial step)
- Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (consult state-court usage to identify realistic probability a statute reaches beyond a federal generic definition)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (ACCA residual clause void for vagueness)
- Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016) (Johnson retroactivity on collateral review)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (origin and use of the categorical approach)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (applied categorical approach to ACCA residual clause)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (modified categorical approach for statutes with alternative elements)
- Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016) (distinction between alternative means and alternative elements)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (principles motivating categorical approach and jury-trial concerns)