United States v. Taylor
736 F.3d 661
2d Cir.2013Background
- On Dec. 24, 2008 a pharmacy robbery in midtown Manhattan left >$12,000 of controlled substances taken; defendants Taylor, Rosario, and Vasquez were later charged in a federal indictment for Hobbs Act robbery, related firearms counts, and (as to Taylor) fraudulently obtaining controlled substances.
- Investigation tied the three to the crime through cooperation of co-defendant Luana Miller and cell-site records; surveillance and witness ID evidence was limited or equivocal.
- Taylor was arrested Apr. 9, 2009; he claims he ingested many Xanax pills that morning in a suicide attempt and was intermittently asleep, disoriented, and evaluated at a hospital and by MCC psychologists.
- Despite his condition, Taylor signed a Miranda waiver and gave a lengthy statement at FBI HQ on Apr. 9; he gave another statement on Apr. 10 after rewarning; both statements implicated Rosario and Vasquez (redacted at trial).
- District court denied suppression, the jury convicted all three, and they appealed challenging voluntariness of Taylor’s statements and related spillover/Confrontation issues for the co-defendants.
- The Second Circuit found Taylor’s Apr. 9 and Apr. 10 statements involuntary (police persisted while he was in and out of consciousness and the Apr. 10 statement was tainted by the first), and held admission was not harmless as to Taylor, Rosario, or Vasquez — vacating convictions and remanding for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Taylor’s Apr. 9 Miranda waiver and statements were knowing and voluntary | Taylor: was incapacitated by Xanax, nodding off, in a stupor; officers overreached and elicited involuntary statements | Government: Taylor signed/admitted understanding Miranda form; was coherent and lucid during questioning; nodding off was intermittent | Held: Apr. 9 waiver may have been knowing but the statement was involuntary because officers continued to question him while his will was overborne; suppression required |
| Whether Taylor’s Apr. 10 waiver/statements were voluntary or tainted by Apr. 9 coercion | Taylor: still impaired that morning; second statement occurred <24 hours later with same agents present, so tainted | Government: Taylor initiated contact and appeared more alert on Apr. 10 | Held: Apr. 10 waiver and statement were involuntary due to lingering incapacity and presumption of taint from the coerced Apr. 9 confession |
| Whether admission of Taylor’s involuntary statements was harmless error as to Taylor | Taylor: statements were central and corroborative; other evidence weak (Miller’s credibility, only cell-site data) | Government: evidence beyond statements (Miller, cell records, surveillance) supported conviction | Held: Not harmless — confessions were critical, emphasized by prosecution, and not cumulative; verdicts vacated and remanded for new trial |
| Whether admission of Taylor’s statements was harmless or violated co-defendants’ rights (spillover/Bruton) | Rosario/Vasquez: statements (even redacted) prejudiced them; limited instruction insufficient | Government: limiting instructions and other evidence would permit harmlessness | Held: Not harmless for co-defendants — limiting instructions insufficient given the probative weight of Taylor’s inculpatory statements; convictions vacated and remanded (Bruton claim left for district court on remand) |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation requires warnings and valid waiver)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (knowing and voluntary Miranda waiver required for admissibility)
- Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (Miranda requirement does not supplant voluntariness inquiry)
- Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (scope of waiver/taint analysis for successive statements)
- Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (voluntariness inquiry considers accused’s mental state and police overreaching)
- Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (statements by seriously wounded/confused suspect were involuntary)
- United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1991) (voluntariness test considers totality of circumstances)
- Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 1998) (prior coerced confession can taint subsequent confession)
- Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (harmless-error standard for involuntary/confession errors)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (harmless-error inquiry: would jury convict beyond reasonable doubt absent error)
- Zappulla v. New York, 391 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2004) (factors for assessing harmlessness of improperly admitted testimony)