United States v. Taylor
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7052
| 7th Cir. | 2011Background
- Taylor was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) for online solicitation of a minor to engage in prostitution or sexual activity and was convicted and sentenced to the minimum 10 years.
- Indicted offenses relied on Indiana laws: fondling in the presence of a minor and child solicitation, both arguing to establish ‘presence’ and ‘solicitation’ elements.
- The central issue was whether ‘sexual activity’ in § 2422(b) encompasses broader acts than ‘sexual act,’ especially where no physical contact occurs.
- The government’s theory rested on Indiana statutes that author, among other things, fondling in the presence of a minor and soliciting a minor to engage in sexual activity.
- No federal definition of ‘sexual activity’ exists in § 2422(b); the court considered whether it should be synonymous with ‘sexual act’ or broader.
- The Seventh Circuit reversed for acquittal, holding the government did not prove that Taylor’s conduct fell within the federal statute under the Indiana analogue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does ‘sexual activity’ in § 2422(b) cover non-contact acts? | Taylor relied on Indiana statutes; government argued broader scope of sexual activity. | Sexual activity requires contact; non-contact acts cannot satisfy § 2422(b). | Ambiguity; lenity favors defendant; sexual activity not established without contact. |
| Is webcam presence enough to satisfy ‘presence of a minor’ under Indiana fondling? | Webcam can place the defendant in the minor’s presence. | Presence requires physical proximity; webcam does not satisfy presence. | Webcam does not place defendant in the presence of a minor; conviction invalid under fondling. |
| Can the solicitation statute reach the alleged conduct to felonize the letters or instructions to a minor apart from meeting? | Solicitation to engage in fondling or touching to arouse is within statute. | Solicitation should require acts with the other party; letters alone may not suffice. | Ambiguity in statutory construction; the court limits application to avoid overbreadth; acquittal affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Mannava, 565 F.3d 412 (7th Cir. 2009) (addressing that a state crime can sustain federal § 2422(b) conviction)
- United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2007) (state crime incorporation into § 2422(b))
- United States v. Dhingra, 371 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2004) (state crime incorporation into § 2422(b))
- United States v. Osborne, 551 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2009) (uses Chapter 109A definitions to interpret other chapters)
- United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008) (rule of lenity; ties resolved in defendant's favor)
- United States v. Cochran, 534 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2008) (presence discussion in Indiana context)
- United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (masturbation as example; general context of sexual activity terms)
- United States v. Holt, 510 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2007) (similarity of situations; travel to meet minor)
- United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2002) (constructive presence considerations in online contexts)
- United States v. Tello, 600 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2010) (online solicitation context similar to present case)