United States v. Tayari Mitchell, 679 F. App'x 259

In 2011, Tayari Rafiki Mitchell pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)).
The district court initially sentenced Mitchell as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
Mitchell filed a § 2255 motion; the Government conceded he no longer qualified as an armed career criminal, and the district court granted relief and resentenced him.
On resentencing the court retained the career-offender enhancement, imposing 160 months, based on two prior North Carolina felony convictions: (1) assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury (conceded as a predicate) and (2) possession with intent to sell and deliver (PWISD) cocaine (disputed).
Mitchell argued the PWISD conviction could not be counted because no separate sentence was imposed for it (it was consolidated for judgment with a trafficking conviction) and the imposed 12-year sentence exceeded the PWISD statutory maximum, implying the sentence applied only to the trafficking count.
The district court and the Fourth Circuit concluded the state judgment unambiguously imposed a 12-year sentence as to the consolidated offenses and that the PWISD conviction therefore qualified as a separate prior sentence for the career-offender inquiry.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Mitchell's prior N.C. PWISD cocaine conviction counts as a career-offender predicate	The PWISD conviction cannot be a prior predicate because no sentence was imposed specifically for it; the 12-year judgment exceeded PWISD's 10-year max so it must apply only to trafficking	The state judgment states the offenses were consolidated for judgment and orders imprisonment for 12 years, indicating the sentence was imposed as to all listed convictions and counted separately from the other qualifying prior conviction	The PWISD conviction qualifies; the judgment shows the sentence was imposed as to the consolidated offenses and counts separately, so career-offender status stands

United States v. Jones, 667 F.3d 477 (4th Cir. 2012) (standard of review and career-offender predicate analysis)
United States v. Davis, 720 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 2013) (consolidated sentence under North Carolina Structured Sentencing counts as a single sentence for career-offender purposes)