United States v. Tavares, 705 F.3d 4

Tavares and Jones were tried together and convicted of conspiracy to transport individuals for prostitution under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count One); Tavares also faced Counts Nine (transporting a minor for prostitution under § 2423(a)) and Ten (sex trafficking of a child under § 1591); Jones faced Counts Nine and Fourteen (transporting a minor).
Evidence showed the defendants pimped young women, including high-school age victims, with episodes of violence and coercion; one incident involved transporting a young woman from Maine to Boston to work as a prostitute.
Tavares received an “organizer or leader” enhancement; Jones was deemed a career offender and sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment; both were sentenced to three years of supervised release.
The district court admitted TB’s testimony (Overt Act J) as relevant to the conspiracy and trafficking charges; TB’s testimony described a violent assault and Tavares’s involvement in reassigning her to Jungle.
The defendants challenged voir dire handling of nicknames (Stallion/Young Stallion and Young Indian), juror discussions, and the district court’s response; the court conducted a three-day voir dire and admitted a measured response to misconduct; no reversible error found.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Effect of nicknames on juror impartiality	Tavares and Jones argue juror taint from nickname discussions.	Tavares/Jones contend district court failed to adequately address misconduct.	No reversible error; district court conducted a measured inquiry and issued appropriate admonitions.
Admissibility of TB testimony about Overt Act J	Evidence of TB’s assault and Tavares’s role is probative of conspiracy and trafficking.	Testimony was irrelevant or prejudicial and should be excluded under 401/403.	Admission not an abuse of discretion; probative and not substantially prejudicial.
Sufficiency of evidence on transporting a minor (Count Nine) and knowledge of minor status	Government proved intent to transport for prostitution and B.B.’s under-18 status.	Knowledge of B.B.’s age was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt; age need not be known.	Evidence sufficient; knowledge of victim’s age not required under § 2423(a).
Aiding and abetting transportation of a minor (Count Nine) – Jones	Jones participated in planning and transport; his presence and discussions show initiative.	Presence alone is insufficient; no active participation.	Evidence sufficient to convict Jones of aiding and abetting.
Coercion of K.S. and admissibility of testimony	Threats or coercion led K.S. to testify; testimony is admissible.	Due process violation if testimony was involuntary or coerced.	No due process violation; cross-examination and context show admissibility.

United States v. Tejeda, 481 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2007) (juror misconduct requires careful, case-specific analysis)
United States v. Diaz, 597 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2010) (two-step analysis for juror misconduct; determine misconduct then prejudice)
United States v. Mikutowicz, 365 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004) (frivolous misconduct allegations need not trigger a hearing)
Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (U.S. 2009) (knowing requirement not necessarily applied to victim’s age in § 2423(a))
United States v. Daniels, 653 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2011) (context of § 2423(a) allows lack of knowledge of victim’s age to prove culpability)