919 F.3d 340
6th Cir.2019Background
- Tamela M. Lee, a Summit County (Ohio) Council member, was accused of taking gifts and other benefits from Omar Abdelqader in exchange for intervening on his and associates' legal/administrative matters. FBI wiretaps and cooperating witnesses supplied evidence of money, gifts, and communications.
- Key episodes: Lee contacted judges/prosecutors about Abdelqader's nephews' assault case (presenting herself as a character witness and urging review), and she drafted a letter on county letterhead to the IRS for an associate of Abdelqader.
- Abdelqader promised payment (recorded statements indicated $200 then $300 more if Lee "finish[ed] up this matter"). Lee received payments and gifts (food, cigarettes, store goods) and later discarded the IRS letter when she suspected recordings.
- Lee was indicted on Counts 1–4 (honest-services mail/wire fraud and Hobbs Act conspiracy/extortion) and Counts 5–6 (obstruction of justice and making false statements). She moved to dismiss Counts 1–4 after McDonnell; the motion was denied.
- At trial a jury convicted Lee on all six counts. On appeal she challenged (a) the indictment’s sufficiency post-McDonnell and (b) sufficiency of the evidence for all convictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of indictment for Counts 1–4 under McDonnell | Indictment adequately alleged elements and factual bases to inform defense | Lee: indictment failed to allege the "official act" or the "more" McDonnell requires (advice/pressure with factual detail) | Affirmed — indictment read liberally alleged facts supporting inference of agreement to perform official acts or to advise/pressure others under McDonnell |
| Meaning of "official act" post-McDonnell | Government: official act includes decision/action on a pending matter or agreement to do so; advice/pressure can suffice | Lee: advice/pressure should require advisory role or leverage; routine constituent contacts insufficient | Court declined to add advisory-role or leverage requirements beyond McDonnell; McDonnell’s two-part test controls |
| Sufficiency of evidence for Counts 1–4 (quid pro quo/agreement) | Evidence (calls, texts, payments, prosecutor testimony) supports inference Lee agreed to perform or effectuate official acts in exchange for value | Lee: contacts were routine constituent services; no proof she actually exerted pressure or held leverage/advisory role | Affirmed — viewing evidence in government’s favor, a rational juror could find agreement/intention beyond reasonable doubt under McDonnell |
| Sufficiency of evidence for Counts 5–6 (obstruction, false statements) | FBI interview lies and destruction of letter showed intent to obstruct and false statements | Lee: answers were inconsistent and could be truthful; no intentional obstruction proved | Affirmed — sufficient evidence of intentional false statements and obstructive acts to support convictions |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (Sup. Ct.) (defines "official act": decision/action on a pending question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy; agrees-to-act or use of position to advise/pressure can suffice)
- Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (U.S. 1974) (indictment sufficiency standard — elements and notice; read liberally)
- United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223 (U.S. 1914) (upholding bribery liability where officials were charged with advising a superior official)
- United States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526 (6th Cir.) (indictment need not recite every element verbatim; factual allegations can supply inferences)
- United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102 (2d Cir.) (post-McDonnell jury instruction issues; contacts alone may be insufficient without evidence of intent to influence official act)
- United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir.) (discusses requirement of effective control/leverage to show extortion under color of official right; court questioned its contemporary applicability)