929 F.3d 95
3rd Cir.2019Background
- Tamara Santarelli was convicted in 2011 of mail/wire fraud and conspiracy; sentenced in 2013 using the 2012 Sentencing Guidelines; conviction became final in December 2014.
- Santarelli timely filed a Section 2255 habeas petition (Nov. 2015) alleging numerous ineffective-assistance-of-counsel failures, including failures to challenge PSR calculation and number-of-victims enhancement.
- While that initial petition remained pending, Santarelli filed a Motion to Amend (Aug. 2016) to add that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the District Court’s use of the 2012 Guidelines (arguing Ex Post Facto implications because 2006/2007 Guidelines were narrower).
- The District Court denied the Motion to Amend as untimely and held the new allegations were a "completely new" Ex Post Facto claim that did not relate back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c); it also denied the initial petition on the merits.
- On appeal, the Third Circuit (Restrepo, J.) reversed: it held the amendment related back because it amplified the same ineffective-assistance claim tied to the common core of operative facts (PSR and victim-count enhancement), and remanded for the District Court to consider the amended petition.
- Santarelli also filed a "Motion to File Subsequent Petition" in the Third Circuit during the appeal; the court held that a petition filed while appellate remedies on an initial petition are still pending is not a "second or successive" petition under AEDPA and should be treated as a motion to amend and transferred to the district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether proposed amendment alleging counsel failed to challenge use of 2012 Guidelines relates back under Rule 15(c) | Amendment clarifies and amplifies original ineffective-assistance claims about PSR/victim-count; thus it relates back | Amendment raises a new Ex Post Facto theory and so is a new, untimely claim that does not relate back | Amendment relates back: it restates/amplifies original claim tied to a common core of operative facts; District Court erred in denying it |
| Whether Ex Post Facto theory in amendment converts motion into a new substantive claim | Santarelli: theory explains why counsel was ineffective (not a new standalone claim) | Government/District Ct: it is a new constitutional claim distinct from original claims | Court: theory is explanatory of the ineffective-assistance claim and does not create a new, unrelated claim |
| Whether a habeas petition filed during an appeal of an initial petition is a "second or successive" petition under AEDPA | Santarelli: such filing is not second/successive because appeal is pending and appellate remedies not exhausted; treated as motion to amend | Government: any petition filed after district court denied initial petition should be treated as second/successive, regardless of pending appeal | Court: not second/successive while appeal of initial petition is pending; treat as motion to amend and transfer to district court |
| Whether court of appeals must perform AEDPA "gatekeeping" for petitions filed during pendency of appeal | Santarelli: no gatekeeping required until appellate remedies exhausted | Government: court of appeals should gatekeep any petition filed after district court denial | Court: gatekeeping not required while appeal is pending; the district court should be allowed to consider the motion to amend after remand, subject to Rule 15 and abuse-of-the-writ doctrine |
Key Cases Cited
- Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005) (relation-back requires common core of operative facts; limits overbroad relation-back in habeas context)
- Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013) (applying amended guidelines that increase recommended sentence can violate Ex Post Facto Clause)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (Rule 60(b) motions that advance or add claims are treated as habeas petitions)
- Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (subsequent petition not necessarily second or successive where initial petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust)
- Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998) (subsequent petition not "second or successive" when prior petition was dismissed as premature)
- Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2011) (AEDPA ensures one full opportunity to seek collateral review; Rule 60(b) motions attacking judgment are second or successive)
- Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d 812 (3d Cir. 2005) (term "second and successive" is a term of art; traditional doctrines like abuse of the writ still apply)