United States v. Suarez
664 F.3d 655
7th Cir.2011Background
- Suarez, a Mexican national, became a lawful permanent resident in 1978 and filed a naturalization application in December 1996.
- He disclosed older arrests but not recent marijuana offenses; INS approved his naturalization in April 1998 and he took the oath May 1998.
- In August 1998, Suarez and co-defendants were charged with possession with intent to distribute approximately 196 pounds of marijuana and conspiracy; offenses occurred in 1996 prior to naturalization.
- He was convicted on both counts and sentenced to 87 months; the district court enhanced for manager/supervisor role and relation to co-defendants.
- About three years after release, the United States moved to revoke Suarez’s naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a); district court granted summary judgment revoking citizenship.
- Suarez appeals, arguing INS discretion could have permitted approval and that extenuating circumstances or sentence length create genuine issues of material fact.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does §1101(f)(3) categorically bar good moral character when offenses occur during the statutory period? | Suarez argues the statute bars good moral character regardless of conviction timing. | Insistence on potential discretionary factors cannot override the statutory bar. | Yes; Suarez is statutorily barred from good moral character. |
| Does 8 C.F.R. §316.10(b)(2) mandatorily require lack of good moral character for controlled-substance violations in the statutory period? | Regulation could permit discretionary relief from lack of good moral character. | Regulation mandates lack of good moral character for violations during the period. | Regulation mandates lack of good moral character. |
| Can the catch-all §316.10(b)(3) with extenuating circumstances save Suarez from lack of good moral character? | Extenuating circumstances may defeat the mandatory bar. | Extenuating circumstances do not negate the mandatory provision here. | Extenuating circumstances do not cure the lack of good moral character. |
| Are the district court’s conclusions supported by collateral-estoppel or other arguments on Suarez's role and deal? | Collateral estoppel may limit re-litigation of issues decided in criminal case. | Post-conviction arguments should not contradict criminal-trial findings. | Courts may not relitigate resolved criminal-trial issues; no relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (U.S. Supreme Court 1981) (illegally procured citizenship when pre-conditions not met; clear/evident standard)
- Ciurinskas v. United States, 148 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1998) (court lacks discretion to refuse revocation when illegal procurement shown)
- Jean-Baptiste v. United States, 395 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2005) (recognizes discretionary aspects of §316.10(b)(3) yet supports lack of moral character under certain regimes)
- United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2007) (Chevron deference applied to §316.10(b)(3) in evaluating extenuating circumstances)