United States v. Stringer, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19159

Thomas B. Stringer was indicted and later convicted by a jury of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344) and aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5)) arising from a scheme using forged checks and fraudulently created bank accounts.
The original indictment identified one victim by reference ("Victim-1"); a superseding indictment filed 25 days before trial alleged Count Two as using "one and more names" without naming victims.
The government had disclosed, a year earlier, documents and the two victim names that it intended to prove at trial.
Stringer moved to dismiss Count Two as constitutionally deficient for failing to name victims and requested a continuance after the superseding indictment; the district court denied dismissal and refused to postpone trial.
Stringer proceeded pro se at trial, was convicted on both counts (the jury found aggravated identity theft as to one of the two victims), and was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment plus supervised release and restitution.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Sufficiency of Count Two (aggravated identity theft)	Indictment tracked statutory language and described the underlying fraud by reference to Count One and specifics about checks and banks, giving adequate notice.	Count Two was constitutionally deficient for failing to name or sufficiently identify the person(s) whose means of identification were used.	The indictment was sufficient; naming victims was not required where the indictment tracked the statute, provided limiting detail, and the defense suffered no prejudice (victim identities were already disclosed).
2) Denial of continuance after superseding indictment	No substantial change in charges; superseding indictment was ministerial and discovery had already supplied necessary details; denial of continuance was within the court’s broad discretion.	The superseding indictment altered the allegations shortly before trial and warranted postponement to prepare to defend against new charges.	No abuse of discretion; Stringer failed to show arbitrariness or prejudice from the denial and the superseding indictment did not materially change the case.

Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (indictment must identify subject matter in congressional witness-refusal prosecutions)
United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (parroting statutory language is often sufficient; Russell limited to special statutes needing extra specificity)
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (indictment must contain elements and fairly inform defendant)
United States v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86 (indictment need only track statute and state time/place approximately)
United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37 (refusal to dismiss charges for lack of specificity absent showing of prejudice)
Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (government must prove defendant knew the identification belonged to another person under § 1028A)
United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231 (filing a superseding indictment does not automatically trigger a Speedy Trial Act 30-day delay)