United States v. Street
917 F.3d 586
7th Cir.2019Background
- Two armed robberies of a cell-phone store occurred minutes before police tracked a stolen phone by GPS to a Walmart parking lot where an abandoned SUV contained stolen phones, cash drawer, and a handgun.
- First officers observed three African‑American men near the SUV; one fled and was arrested; two others were not immediately located.
- During a controlled evacuation of the Walmart, Deputy Knipfer was instructed to stop Keycie Street—the only African‑American male among exiting patrons—because he partially fit the general description and officers suspected a third suspect might be inside.
- Knipfer briefly detained Street, asked for identifying information, ran a warrant check, and released him after 10–15 minutes; Street later was identified by co‑defendants from photos and arrested; DNA linked him to the SUV.
- Street moved to suppress the ID and derivative evidence, arguing the stop violated the Fourth Amendment as a race‑based hunch; the magistrate judge found the stop unconstitutional but recommended denial of suppression under attenuation; the district judge adopted the recommendation and denied suppression.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion under Terry based on the totality of circumstances and that the government did not waive its alternative argument by failing to object to the magistrate judge’s reasoning.
Issues
| Issue | Street's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Was the brief investigatory stop a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion? | Stop was an unconstitutional seizure based on a hunch and Street's race/sex. | The stop was a Terry stop (seizure) but justified by reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances. | Court treated it as a Terry stop but held officers had reasonable suspicion to detain and identify Street. |
| 2) Did officers have reasonable suspicion to stop Street? | No—clothing and conduct did not match suspects; two suspects already in custody, so speculation about a third was insufficient. | Yes—hot pursuit, GPS lead to the lot, abandoned car with contraband and a gun, observation of three Black men walking from the car, temporal and spatial proximity, and Street being the only Black male exiting. | Held reasonable suspicion existed based on timing, location, movements observed, and limited descriptive match; stop was permissible. |
| 3) Could Deputy Knipfer rely on other officers' information (collective knowledge)? | Knipfer lacked firsthand suspicion so his stop was a hunch. | Collective‑knowledge doctrine permits Knipfer to act on colleagues' information if reliance was objective, supplying officers had articulable facts, and intrusion was not excessive. | Held collective knowledge applied: Knipfer reasonably relied on colleagues, the supplying officers had articulable facts, and the stop was minimally intrusive. |
| 4) Did the government waive its alternative reasonable‑suspicion argument by not objecting to the magistrate judge's contrary finding? | N/A (Street argued government waived). | Government argued it need not object because it prevailed overall and may advance alternative grounds affirming denial of suppression. | Held government did not waive the argument; prevailing party may advance alternative grounds supporting the same outcome. |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (Terry stop standard: reasonable suspicion for brief investigative seizures)
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (totality of circumstances and officer inferences in reasonable‑suspicion analysis)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (race‑based selective enforcement is unconstitutional; descriptions including race may be considered)
- Hensley v. Williams, 469 U.S. 221 (collective‑knowledge and reliance on information from other officers/agents)
- United States v. Arthur, 764 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. decision upholding Terry stop in similar armed‑robbery facts)
- United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 247 (7th Cir. on collective knowledge test and reliance)
- Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (attenuation doctrine and limits of exclusionary rule)
