United States v. Strange, 65 F.4th 86

Steven K. Strange, a senior supervisor at Collins Aerospace (UTC), ran a scheme from 2015–2019 submitting fabricated donation documentation to UTC’s employee matching program to an entity he controlled, obtaining about $600,000 for personal use.
Strange pled guilty to one count of wire fraud; presentence investigation and memoranda were prepared; sentencing delayed by COVID-19 scheduling.
Days before sentencing Strange submitted three letters (from his employer, physician, and a friend) urging probation; the government’s investigation showed Strange had forged/drafted those letters without the purported authors’ knowledge.
The government moved for a two-level obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and opposed a three-level acceptance-of-responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1; the Probation Office recommended applying the obstruction enhancement and denying the reduction.
The district court applied the § 3C1.1 enhancement, denied the § 3E1.1 reduction, and sentenced Strange to 57 months’ imprisonment; Strange appealed the two decisions.
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding the forged sentencing letters supported the obstruction enhancement and that denial of the acceptance reduction was not an abuse of discretion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a two-level obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 applies to forged letters submitted at sentencing	Government: Letters were willful falsehoods submitted during sentencing, related to the sentencing and capable of influencing the court; thus § 3C1.1 applies	Strange: Letters did not relate to the underlying offense conduct or relevant conduct and were not material to sentencing	Court: Affirmed § 3C1.1—"related to" includes submissions aimed at influencing sentencing; at least two letters were material and would have affected the sentence
Whether the district court erred in denying a three-level acceptance-of-responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1	Government: Obstructive conduct and forged letters show lack of acceptance; conduct mirrors the convicted offense and supports denial	Strange: Guilty plea and admission of responsibility warrant the reduction; this is an extraordinary case meriting both adjustments	Court: Affirmed denial—district court did not abuse discretion; obstruction conduct ordinarily negates acceptance and these letters resembled his offense conduct

United States v. Khedr, 343 F.3d 96 (2d Cir.) (sets mixed standard of review for § 3C1.1 application)
United States v. Stephens, 369 F.3d 25 (2d Cir.) (false testimony or statements that would influence a court support obstruction enhancement)
United States v. Rickert, 685 F.3d 760 (8th Cir.) (false letters submitted to sentencing court can constitute obstruction)
United States v. Byors, 586 F.3d 222 (2d Cir.) (explains temporal and nexus requirements of § 3C1.1)
United States v. Ortiz, 218 F.3d 107 (2d Cir.) (guilty plea alone does not guarantee acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment)
United States v. Butters, [citation="513 F. App'x 103"] (2d Cir.) (false statements to probation/pretrial services in connection with presentence proceedings can support obstruction)