34 F.4th 415
5th Cir.2022Background
- Adrian Stoglin pleaded guilty to a cocaine‑base conspiracy and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of that offense; the indictment alleged a prior Texas aggravated‑assault conviction.
- The PSR treated the Texas aggravated‑assault conviction (ten‑year sentence) as a § 3559 "serious violent felony," which triggered the statutory 120‑month mandatory minimum and an 8‑year supervised‑release minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).
- Stoglin did not object in district court; he was sentenced to 120 months (conspiracy) + 60 months (firearm), consecutively, and timely appealed.
- On appeal Stoglin relied on Borden v. United States to argue Texas aggravated assault cannot qualify under § 3559’s elements clause because the Texas statute permits reckless mens rea.
- The Government at times conceded that the enhancement was erroneous but later argued the state plea facts showed knowing/intentional conduct and that resentencing was unnecessary.
- The Fifth Circuit concluded the enhancement was plain error, that the error affected substantial rights, and it exercised its discretion to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Texas aggravated assault qualifies as a § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) "serious violent felony" under the elements clause given Borden | Government maintained the state plea/indictment showed intentional/knowing conduct sufficient to qualify | Stoglin: Borden bars an elements‑clause qualification if the statute allows reckless mens rea; Texas §22.01(a)(1) is divisible and admits recklessness | Court: Clear and obvious error — Texas aggravated assault can be committed recklessly and therefore does not qualify under the elements clause per Borden |
| Whether the sentencing error affected Stoglin’s substantial rights (plain‑error second prong) | Government later argued the factual admissions meant the sentence was appropriate despite the technical error | Stoglin: The error raised the statutory floor from 5–40 yrs to 10–life and changed guidelines; reasonable probability of a lesser sentence exists | Court: Satisfied — the erroneous enhancement produced a higher statutory minimum and altered the Guidelines, creating a reasonable probability of a different outcome |
| Whether the court should exercise its discretion to correct the plain error (plain‑error fourth prong) | Government argued resentencing unnecessary because state plea shows intentional conduct and sentence was appropriate on merits | Stoglin: Severity of prior conduct is not a reason to deny plain‑error relief; resentencing is the proper forum to consider factual aggravation | Court: Exercised discretion to correct error and remanded, citing Rosales‑Mireles and rejecting reliance on underlying state facts to block resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) (an offense that can be committed recklessly does not qualify under ACCA’s elements‑clause use‑of‑force definition)
- Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (plain‑error review framework)
- Molina‑Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016) (error in Guidelines range usually shows reasonable probability of different outcome)
- Rosales‑Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897 (2018) (limits on denying plain‑error relief; sentencing‑merits and plain‑error analyses are distinct)
- United States v. Gomez‑Gomez, 23 F.4th 575 (5th Cir. 2022) (Texas aggravated assault includes reckless mental state; Borden applies)
- United States v. Parker, 3 F.4th 178 (5th Cir. 2021) (elements language of ACCA and § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) are very similar and analyzed similarly)