United States v. Stinson
647 F.3d 1196
| 9th Cir. | 2011Background
- Stinson and Griffin were convicted in a single trial of RICO conspiracy for operating the Aryan Brotherhood (AB) prison gang, with Stinson also convicted of VICAR crimes.
- Overt acts included murders, attempted murders, and conspiracies to murder, tied to AB leadership and control within California prisons.
- Venue challenged: VICAR counts allegedly occurred in Northern District of California, but district court held continuing-offense theory made venue proper in the Central District under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).
- Defendants were sentenced to life terms on RICO; Stinson received additional life terms on VICAR counts; Griffin’s case also proceeded with joint trial context.
- The district court denied severance, Batson challenges, and several defense motions, and instructed jurors to consider each defendant separately on each charged count.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is venue proper for VICAR counts in the Central District? | Venue proper under continuing-offense theory as essential conduct occurred in Central District. | Venue improper since murders occurred in Northern District; only post-offense facts in Central District. | Yes; VICAR is a continuing offense; venue proper in Central District. |
| Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying severance? | Joinder allowed efficient trial and jury instructions prevented prejudice. | Joinder prejudiced Griffin due to unrelated Stinson evidence. | No abuse of discretion; joint trial permissible with proper instructions. |
| Did death-qualification of the jury violate Sixth Amendment rights? | No error; McCree/Buchanan permit death-qualifying even where non-capital defendants are jointly tried with capital ones. | Death-qualification potentially biased; violated impartial jury guarantees. | No Sixth Amendment violation; district court properly death-qualified the jury. |
| Was there reversible prosecutorial misconduct (vouching) during Halualani cross-examination and related testimony? | Questioning implied credibility of informants constituted vouching and prejudiced defense. | Any vouching was harmless given strong evidence and curative instructions. | Harmless error; cumulative evidence and instructions rendered misconduct non-prejudicial. |
| Were partial read-backs of testimony error requiring reversal? | Partial read-backs risked undue emphasis and prejudice. | Any error was limited and outweighed by substantial other evidence. | No substantial rights affected; no reversal for read-backs. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999) (continuing-offense venue analysis for § 3237)
- United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1 (1998) (continuing offenses and venue in multi-district offenses)
- United States v. Pace, 314 F.3d 344 (2002) (recognizes continuing-offense approach in venue cases)
- United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 959 (2008) (defines elements and conduct in VICAR context for venue/continuing-offense analysis)
- Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) (joint trials and severance standard; prejudice present as risk)
- Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (death-qualifying juries in capital cases does not violate impartiality)
- Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987) (death qualification permissible in non-capital defendants tried with capital defendants)
- Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) (concerning acts of concealment in conspiracy cases)
- Nobari, 574 F.3d 1065 (2009) (opening door on cross-examination limits vouching relevance of informant credibility testimony)
- Sarkisian, 197 F.3d 966 (1999) (harmless error standard for prosecutorial misconduct; weighing strength of case)