United States v. Stevenson Harrison, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 22483

Harrison, on federal supervised release, was charged in a revocation petition with multiple violations including two Virginia felony warrants for malicious injury to law-enforcement officers and related misdemeanors after an August 29, 2014 altercation in Bristol, VA.
At the revocation hearing Harrison admitted running from officers and that his shirt was grabbed and torn, causing officers to fall, but denied assaulting them; he disputed only the legal characterization under Virginia law.
The government introduced hearsay through a U.S. probation officer (Bradley Cox) who relayed facts from Virginia arrest warrants and an incident report rather than calling the Virginia officers to testify live; Harrison objected under Rule 32.1 and confrontation principles.
The district court overruled the confrontation objection, found the violations proved, classified the Virginia felony (Va. Code § 18.2-51.1) as a "crime of violence," revoked supervised release and sentenced Harrison to 24 months.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the hearsay because live testimony would have been unreasonably burdensome and the reports were sufficiently reliable (corroborated by Harrison’s admissions), and (2) the Virginia statute, on its face, meets USSG § 4B1.2(a)’s definition of a crime of violence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Harrison)	Defendant's Argument (Gov't)	Held
Admissibility of hearsay at revocation hearing / confrontation right	District court abused discretion by admitting hearsay; Harrison was entitled to live testimony to confront witnesses	Live testimony would be unduly burdensome; hearsay (warrants/reports) bore indicia of reliability and were corroborated by Harrison’s admissions	Affirmed: court may admit hearsay where producing live witnesses is impractical and substitute evidence is demonstrably reliable; here travel burden and reliability justified admission
Whether Va. Code § 18.2-51.1 is a "crime of violence" under USSG § 4B1.2(a)	Court erred by considering facts; under categorical approach only statutory elements matter and gov't did not prove elements	Warrants quoted the statute’s elements (maliciously causing bodily injury with intent to maim/disfigure/disable/kill and knowledge victim was an officer); statute’s elements satisfy § 4B1.2(a)	Affirmed: considering statutory elements, the Virginia offense categorically qualifies as a crime of violence and thus a Grade A violation

United States v. Boyd, 792 F.3d 916 (8th Cir.) (standard of review for supervised-release revocation)
United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1986) (balancing defendant’s confrontation right against government reasons for not producing witness; reliability inquiry)
United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840 (8th Cir. 2004) (appellate court may perform Bell balancing when record sufficiently developed)
United States v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2013) (police reports less reliable absent officer testimony; government must explain unavailability)
United States v. Lynch, 611 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2010) (applying categorical approach to determine if state offense is a crime of violence for supervised-release purposes)
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (categorical approach framework for matching statutes to federal definitions)
United States v. Tessmer, 659 F.3d 716 (8th Cir.) (de novo review of whether an offense qualifies as a crime of violence under the Guidelines)