881 F.3d 1249
10th Cir.2018Background
- After a widely publicized police shooting in Tulsa, Jeffrey A. Stevens (a Connecticut resident) posted 10 anonymous messages to the Tulsa Police Department’s online complaint form threatening violence against Officer Betty Shelby and other Tulsa officials and officers.
- FBI agents traced the posts to Stevens; he confessed.
- A grand jury indicted Stevens on 10 counts under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (interstate communications containing threats).
- Stevens moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing his posts were protected political speech and not “true threats.” The district court denied the motion, concluding a reasonable jury could find the posts were true threats.
- Stevens pled guilty to five counts while reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss; the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Stevens’s online posts qualify as "true threats" under § 875(c) | Stevens: posts were political protest/hyperbole about police violence and thus protected speech | Government/Respondent: posts threatened specific people/groups and conveyed imminent deadly intent; a reasonable person could view them as true threats | Affirmed: a reasonable jury could find the posts to be true threats |
| Whether the First Amendment shields threats that accompany political speech | Stevens: political context of national debate over police conduct protects his speech | Government: political content does not immunize speech that also contains true threats | Court: political speech is not protected when accompanied by true threats |
| Whether sender’s physical location (Connecticut) negates intent/ability to threaten Tulsa recipients | Stevens: being out-of-state shows lack of intent/ability to carry out threats | Government: recipients did not know sender’s location; even if they did, travel or proxies could make threats plausible | Court: location did not preclude a reasonable jury finding of intent/ability; argument rejected |
| Whether whether determination of true threat is a question for the jury or appropriate for dismissal as a matter of law | Stevens: statements are protected so indictment should be dismissed | Government: context and language permit jury to decide | Court: generally a jury question; here sufficient for reasonable jury to find true threats, so dismissal improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (mens rea requirement: government must prove speaker intended the communication as a threat or knew it would be viewed as a threat)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (definition of a threat as a serious expression of intent to commit unlawful violence against a particular individual or group)
- Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (context can show political hyperbole rather than a true threat)
- United States v. Wheeler, 776 F.3d 736 (10th Cir. 2015) (§ 875(c) applies only to true threats; reasonable-person standard requires examining language and context)
- United States v. Martin, 163 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 1998) (multiple, repeated, motive-linked statements can support a jury finding of true threats)