United States v. Stevens
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10360
| 1st Cir. | 2011Background
- Stevens was convicted in Rhode Island in 1993 of a sex crime and initially complied with state sex offender registration.
- He later stopped keeping Rhode Island registrations current and pleaded no contest in 1996 for failing to register.
- In 2001 and after, he was convicted again for failing to keep his state registration current and received a suspended sentence.
- In 2007, Stevens moved from Rhode Island to Maine and failed to register there or notify Rhode Island authorities.
- In 2008, a federal grand jury indicted Stevens for non-compliance with SORNA, 18 U.S.C. § 2250.
- After a bench trial, the district court convicted Stevens, determining he had constructive knowledge of the registration obligation even without actual knowledge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether interstate travel triggers SORNA registration obligation. | Stevens argues travel occurred before 2007 implementing rule; not triggered. | Travel after enactment should trigger only under regulation date 2007. | SORNA fully effective at enactment; travel in 2007 activated registration requirement. |
| What knowledge standard applies to 'knowingly fail to register' under § 2250(a). | Requires actual knowledge of the obligation to register (specific intent). | Knowledge of the facts constituting the offense suffices; no need for actual knowledge of the statute. | 'Knowingly' requires knowledge of the facts; general intent suffices. |
| Does due process require actual knowledge or a Lambert exception apply. | Ignorance of the law could be a due process problem. | Lambert exception might apply to passive conduct, but not here. | Lambert exception does not apply; no due process violation. |
| Whether SORNA is within Congress's Commerce Clause authority. | CONGRESS lacked authority to regulate noncommercial conduct. | SORNA falls within Commerce Clause authority. | SORNA is within Congress's Commerce Clause power. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (U.S. 1998) (knowledge of the facts constitutes 'knowingly' standard)
- United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215 (1st Cir. 1999) (knowledge standard aligned with Bryan)
- United States v. Gagnon, 621 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (Lambert due process exception not applicable here)
- United States v. DiTomasso, 621 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2010) (SORNA within Commerce Clause authority)
- United States v. Fuller, 627 F.3d 499 (2d Cir. 2010) (court recognized general-intent standard for knowledge in SORNA context)
- United States v. Voice, 622 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 2010) (recognizes general-intent knowledge standard for SORNA)
- United States v. Vasquez, 611 F.3d 325 (7th Cir. 2010) (supports general-intent interpretation of knowledge in § 2250(a))