United States v. Steven Pittman
816 F.3d 419
6th Cir.2016Background
- Police, monitoring a suspected dealer via an informant, followed Steven Pittman after his car matched the described vehicle; they stopped him when he made a left turn without signaling.
- Pittman admitted there was cocaine in his car; officers recovered cocaine and a scale. After Miranda warnings he consented to a home search and police recovered two firearms.
- A federal grand jury indicted Pittman for distributing cocaine and being a felon in possession of firearms. He moved to suppress the car and home evidence; the district court denied suppression.
- Over pretrial proceedings Pittman rejected five appointed attorneys; the district court found he had effectively waived his right to counsel and required him to proceed pro se with stand-by counsel.
- A jury convicted Pittman; he was sentenced to 235 months. He appealed, raising suppression, forgery/expert-evidence, Rule 16 disclosure, and Sixth Amendment counsel/colloquy claims.
Issues
| Issue | Pittman’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of traffic stop (Fourth Amendment) | Stop lacked probable cause; failure to signal didn’t justify stop | Pittman violated municipal and Tennessee turn-signal laws; officers had probable cause | Stop was lawful; probable cause existed under local code and Tenn. law |
| Consent/home-search/forgery allegation | Signature on consent form was forged; court should reopen suppression hearing | Reopening was untimely and Pittman gave no credible reason for delay; earlier claim was duress not forgery | District court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to reopen; evidence insufficient to show forgery |
| Admissibility of handwriting expert | Court erred excluding government expert testimony on forgery because remedy was excessive | Pittman failed to comply with Rule 16 disclosure; exclusion was an appropriate sanction to avoid further delay | Exclusion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2) was not an abuse of discretion given delay, prejudice, and inconclusive expert results |
| Right to counsel / Faretta colloquy | Court violated Sixth Amendment by forcing pro se representation and delaying full Faretta-style colloquy until jury selection | Court may refuse appointment of successive counsel for an indigent who repeatedly rejects appointed lawyers; prior warnings and discussion made waiver knowing | No Sixth Amendment violation; defendant’s repeated refusals amounted to waiver of counsel and the court adequately warned him (colloquy was later provided) |
Key Cases Cited
- Weaver v. Shadoan, 340 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2003) (discusses reasonable suspicion standard for traffic stops)
- United States v. Freeman, 209 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2000) (addresses probable cause for traffic stops)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on objective factors, not officer motive)
- United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1985) (courts should be reluctant to grant reopenings)
- United States v. Maples, 60 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1995) (sanctions for Rule 16 violations and preference for least severe sanction)
- United States v. Green, 388 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 2004) (no constitutional right to demand repeated appointment of new counsel)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant must knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel to proceed pro se)
- United States v. Coles, 695 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2012) (district courts have discretion in dealing with defendants who waive counsel by conduct)