United States v. Steven Metro
882 F.3d 431
3rd Cir.2018Background
- Steven Metro, a former law-firm managing clerk, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate securities laws and insider trading after providing material nonpublic information to middleman Frank Tamayo (2009–2013).
- Tamayo passed Metro’s tips to broker Vladimir Eydelman, who executed trades for multiple clients; combined illicit gains from Metro-based tips totaled about $5.67 million.
- The PSR attributed the entire $5.6M+ of gain to Metro under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4, producing an 18-level enhancement and a guideline range of 57–71 months (reduced for acceptance and a 2-level variance to 46–57 months).
- Metro disputed attribution of Eydelman’s gains, arguing he did not know of Eydelman while tipping Tamayo and did not intend Tamayo to pass tips to a broker.
- At sentencing the District Court overruled Metro’s objection without resolving disputed facts, relying on commentary to § 2B1.4 and this Court’s decision in Kluger to attribute all gains to Metro and imposing a 46-month sentence.
- The Third Circuit vacated and remanded: it held the district court failed to conduct the individualized scope inquiry required by § 1B1.3 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i) before attributing downstream gains to Metro.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Metro) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether gains from Eydelman’s trades may be attributed to Metro under § 2B1.4 | Metro argued he did not act in concert with or provide inside information to Eydelman and lacked knowledge of Eydelman during the tipping period | Gov’t argued Kluger allows attribution to the tipper when downstream trading flowed from the tip and that Metro need only have known someone else was obtaining the information | The court held that § 2B1.4’s gain analysis requires first identifying the defendant’s scope of relevant conduct under § 1B1.3; attribution is not automatic without resolving scope/knowledge facts |
| Whether the district court satisfied its obligation to resolve disputed sentencing facts (Rule 32(i)) | Metro argued the court failed to resolve factual disputes (e.g., knowledge of Eydelman) and improperly relied on the plea and Kluger without findings | Gov’t relied on the plea, the conspiracy charge naming Eydelman, and a post-scheme transcript to support attribution | The court held the district court erred by not resolving disputed facts or making findings by a preponderance of the evidence; vacated sentence and remanded for resentencing and factfinding |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Kluger, 722 F.3d 549 (3d Cir. 2013) (addressed attribution of insider-trading gains where defendant knowingly acted with and intended information to reach downstream broker)
- United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1992) (requires searching, individualized inquiry into defendant’s role when attributing co-conspirator conduct at sentencing)
- Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (Supreme Court 1993) (treats Sentencing Guidelines commentary as authoritative absent inconsistency)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (Supreme Court 2007) (procedural sentencing errors, including improper guideline calculations, typically require remand)
- United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (erroneous guideline range commonly mandates reversal)
- United States v. Mannino, 212 F.3d 835 (3d Cir. 2000) (sentencing accountability is not coextensive with conspiracy liability)
