143 F.4th 1264
11th Cir.2025Background
- Steven Morgan and his brother orchestrated a scheme to smuggle cocaine from the Caribbean into South Florida, using shipping jars with false bottoms.
- The scheme was discovered after law enforcement intercepted cocaine packages at a Puerto Rican airport and conducted a controlled delivery to South Florida, resulting in Morgan’s arrest.
- During the arrest, officers seized two cellphones and a gun; Morgan, after Miranda warnings and invocation of rights, disclaimed ownership of one phone (the LG).
- Agents later conducted a warrantless search of the LG phone, finding incriminating evidence.
- The district court denied Morgan’s motion to suppress the phone’s contents, finding abandonment, and admitted related statements as evidence, resulting in Morgan’s conviction on drug and gun charges.
- On appeal, Morgan challenged the admissibility of the phone’s contents and several evidentiary rulings, raising constitutional claims under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, as well as procedural and evidentiary issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of LG phone contents (Warrantless search/Abandonment) | Morgan claimed the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment; he did not abandon the phone as he hadn’t voluntarily relinquished his interest. | U.S. argued Morgan expressly disclaimed ownership, constituting abandonment of any reasonable expectation of privacy. | No Fourth Amendment violation; Morgan objectively abandoned the LG phone. |
| Voluntariness of statement after Miranda invocation (Fifth Amendment) | Statement disavowing the LG phone was compelled, as officers obtained it after Morgan invoked rights and misled him, rendering it involuntary and excludable. | U.S. countered any Miranda violation did not render the statement involuntary, invoking Patane; the statement was voluntary. | Statement voluntary; Miranda violation didn’t require suppression of phone evidence if statement not coerced. |
| Admission of agent lay overview testimony (Rule 701) | Gaviria’s summary was improper overview beyond her personal rational perception and usurped the jury’s role. | Testimony was based on evidence Gaviria had personally reviewed; no binding precedent prohibits this overview. | No plain error; testimony admissible as based on her investigation and reviewed evidence. |
| Admission of expert testimony and disclosure adequacy (Rule 16/703) | Suarez’s opinions not adequately disclosed; relied on inadmissible suppressed evidence; opinions were case-specific and prejudicial. | Disclosures complied with rule; opinions were based primarily on expertise and admissible evidence, not suppressed statements. | No error or plain error; disclosures sufficient and testimony admissible. |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (warrant generally required before searching a cell phone)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (prophylactic rules to protect Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights)
- United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (physical fruits of Miranda violation admissible if statement voluntary)
- Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (Miranda-violative statements can be used to impeach credible testimony if voluntary)
- Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (one constitutional right cannot be sacrificed to assert another; suppression hearing statements unusable at trial)