United States v. Sterling
2016 CAAF LEXIS 639
C.A.A.F.2016Background
- LCpl Sterling, a Marine with documented performance issues and contentious relations with superiors, posted three 8½x11 signs at her shared workstation reading “No weapon formed against me shall prosper.”
- Her immediate supervisor, SSgt Alexander, ordered the signs removed because the desk was shared and the signs were seen as combative; Sterling did not tell supervisors the signs were religious or seek a religious accommodation and refused to remove them.
- SSgt Alexander removed the signs after Sterling refused; Sterling later re-posted them and again refused orders to remove them.
- Sterling was tried by special court-martial, convicted of, inter alia, failing to go to appointed duty and disobeying NCO orders; she argued mid-trial that the removal orders violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).
- The Navy–Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals held the orders lawful and concluded posting the signs was not an "exercise of religion" as part of a system of belief; the Supreme Court of the Navy–Marine Corps (this Court) affirmed on other grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Sterling's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether posting the signs constituted an "exercise of religion" under RFRA | Posting the biblical phrase was religiously motivated (a nondenominational Christian practice) and thus triggers RFRA protection | The signs were not manifestly religious, Sterling never informed command or sought accommodation, and posting was effectively personal/antagonistic, not religious exercise | RFRA’s definition is broad enough to include the conduct, but Sterling failed to make a prima facie RFRA case; Court assumes exercise for analysis but rules against Sterling on burden grounds |
| Whether removal orders substantially burdened Sterling’s religious exercise | Removing the signs forced her to choose between obeying orders or violating her religion and facing court-martial | Not every interference with religiously motivated conduct is a "substantial burden"; Sterling presented no evidence the signs were required by or central to her faith or that removal coerced abandonment of belief | No substantial burden shown: Sterling did not demonstrate the signs were important to her religious practice or that removal coerced violation of beliefs |
| Whether the NCO’s orders had a valid military purpose and were lawful | Orders were unlawful under RFRA (defense to disobedience) | Orders related to military duty: preserving shared workspace, maintaining good order and discipline given Sterling’s antagonistic relationship | Orders were lawful; presumption of lawfulness not rebutted — maintaining good order and discipline is a valid military purpose |
| Whether failure to notify command or seek accommodation affects RFRA claim | Not required by RFRA; servicemembers can assert RFRA defense later and need not request permission before exercising religion | The availability of a prompt accommodation process and the failure to notify/seek exemption are relevant; minimal notice is reasonable in military context and can reduce any burden to de minimis | Court held that failure to inform command or seek accommodation is relevant and Sterling’s failure weighed against finding a substantial burden; accommodation process may reduce burdens to de minimis |
Key Cases Cited
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (RFRA’s definition of religious exercise and substantial-burden framework)
- Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) (sincerity and substantial-burden principles under RFRA)
- Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (courts should not question centrality of beliefs; scope of religious exercise)
- Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (substantial burden compels choice between faith and adverse consequences)
- Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military necessity and deference to good order and discipline)
- Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (unique military exigencies justify limits on individual rights)