United States v. Stephanie Lois Watkins
880 F.3d 1221
11th Cir.2018Background
- Stephanie Watkins, a Jamaican national and former lawful permanent resident, was deported in 2003 after a Florida grand theft conviction and later reentered the U.S.; arrested in 2016 and indicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 for illegal reentry after deportation.
- Watkins argued the 2003 deportation was invalid because, after Descamps (2013), Florida grand theft no longer qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), so she could not be prosecuted for reentry based on that order.
- Before trial Watkins moved to dismiss the indictment and unsuccessfully moved the BIA to reopen her removal proceedings; she waited more than three years after Descamps to seek reopening.
- The government sought and obtained Watkins’s fingerprints post-indictment and offered a fingerprint analyst to identify her as the previously removed person; other government witnesses and Watkins’s own admissions also tied her to the prior removal.
- The district court denied dismissal, permitted fingerprinting, admitted fingerprint-analyst testimony (later characterized as probably unreliable but harmless), convicted Watkins, and sentenced her to time served plus supervised release.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Watkins may collaterally attack her 2003 deportation order in § 1326 proceedings | Watkins: Descamps means her Florida grand theft conviction is not a CIMT, so her deportation was invalid and she cannot be prosecuted for reentry | Government: Watkins cannot collaterally attack the removal because she had meaningful avenues for judicial review (BIA reopening, judicial review) and did not exhaust them | Held: Denied — Watkins may not collaterally attack; she had opportunity for judicial review and failed to pursue timely reopening or appeal |
| Whether equitable tolling could excuse Watkins’s delay in seeking to reopen her removal | Watkins: Descamps was decided in 2013; equitable tolling should permit a reopening motion filed after Descamps | Government: Watkins did not show diligence or extraordinary circumstances to justify tolling | Held: BIA considered tolling and denied it for lack of diligence; court agreed Watkins failed to show she was deprived of meaningful review |
| Whether the district court erred by ordering post-indictment fingerprinting | Watkins: Argument invoked privacy/self-incrimination protections against compelled evidence | Government: Fingerprints are physical evidence and not protected by Fifth or Fourth Amendment against collection | Held: No error — fingerprints may be compelled as source of physical evidence |
| Whether admission of fingerprint-analyst expert testimony was erroneous | Watkins: Analyst’s methods and data were insufficient to satisfy Rule 702/Daubert | Government: Analyst testimony aided identity and tied Watkins to removal records | Held: Probably erroneous (unreliable) but harmless given other identity evidence and Watkins’s admissions |
Key Cases Cited
- Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980) (statutory context limiting collateral attack where other remedies exist)
- United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987) (due-process requires meaningful judicial review before deportation order used as element in § 1326 prosecution)
- Avila-Santoyo v. United States Attorney General, 713 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. en banc 2013) (equitable tolling applies to motion-to-reopen deadlines)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (Fifth Amendment does not bar compelled production of physical evidence)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (trial court gatekeeping duties for scientific expert testimony)