362 F. Supp. 3d 22
D.D.C.2019Background
- Defendant Alla Stepanets was convicted by a jury of six misdemeanor violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) after a ten-and-a-half week trial; she was acquitted on related felony counts.
- Stepanets moved under Rule 29 for judgment of acquittal and alternatively for a new trial under Rule 33 on the convicted counts. The court considered both motions together.
- Her principal arguments: (1) strict-liability misdemeanors under the FDCA violate due process; (2) she lacked managerial responsibility or power to prevent the offenses; and (3) the evidence did not show she "dispensed" drugs as the statute requires.
- The court declined to overrule Supreme Court precedents permitting FDCA strict-liability prosecutions and explained it lacked power to do so.
- The court noted binding First Circuit precedent defining "dispense" to include pharmacists' routine checking that can trigger drug shipments, and applied the law-of-the-case/mandate principles from the First Circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of FDCA strict-liability misdemeanors | FDCA misdemeanors that lack mens rea violate due process | Supreme Court precedent permits such strict-liability enforcement under FDCA | Denied; court bound by Supreme Court precedents (Dotterweich, Park) allowing strict liability |
| Corporate/officer liability standard | Stepanets lacked managerial authority/responsibility to be held liable | Government: liability charged is for defendant's own acts, not solely officer delegation | Denied; Dotterweich/Park language on officer liability not controlling because case involves personal-act prong |
| Meaning of "dispense" under FDCA | "Dispense" should be read to require pharmacist act of filling and delivering prescriptions | Government and First Circuit: "dispense" can include pharmacists' routine checking that triggers shipments | Denied; bound by First Circuit's definitional ruling that "dispense" may include confirming prescriptions |
| Sufficiency of evidence re: knowledge of invalid prescriptions | No evidence she knew prescriptions used false patient names | Government: record supports inference she knew; court previously rejected contrary legal claim | Denied; court found sufficient evidence and noted prior rulings rejecting defendant's contention |
Key Cases Cited
- Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (discusses role of mens rea in criminal law)
- United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (upholds strict-liability officer liability under FDCA)
- United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (extends corporate/officer liability under FDCA for public-health risks)
- United States v. Olbres, 61 F.3d 967 (1st Cir. 1995) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence post-verdict)
- United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967 (1st Cir. 1995) (evidentiary-sufficiency principles)
- United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707 (1st Cir. 1992) (‘‘viewpoint principle’’ on considering evidence as a whole)
- United States v. Rothrock, 806 F.2d 318 (1st Cir. 1986) (Rule 33 new-trial standard allowing assessment of weight and credibility)
- United States v. Andrade, 94 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1996) (new trial warranted only to avoid miscarriage of justice)
- United States v. Indelicato, 611 F.2d 376 (1st Cir. 1979) (new-trial standard discussion)
- United States v. Stepanets, 879 F.3d 367 (1st Cir. 2018) (First Circuit definition of "dispense" binding on remand)
- United States v. Matthews, 643 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2011) (law-of-the-case exceptions)
- Conley v. United States, 323 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2003) (mandate rule requires compliance with appellate remand instructions)
- Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 741 F.3d 170 (1st Cir. 2013) (mandate-rule principles reaffirmed)
