United States v. Stepanets
879 F.3d 367
| 1st Cir. | 2018Background
- Defendants Alla Stepanets, Kathy Chin, and Michelle Thomas were licensed Massachusetts pharmacists employed at New England Compounding Center (NECC) and worked in its packing area checking orders before shipment.
- A grand jury indicted them (among others) on multiple counts, including that they "dispensed" misbranded prescription drugs in violation of the FFDCA (21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 353(b)(1), 333(a)(2)), and charged them as principals and as aiders/abettors (18 U.S.C. § 2).
- The indictment identified specific shipments, dates, destinations, and allegedly fake patient names tied to particular defendants' actions (e.g., approving shipments based on obviously fraudulent prescriptions).
- The district court dismissed the FFDCA counts, reasoning the defendants performed clerical tasks (not "dispensing"), that the statute was vague as applied, and that mere presence did not support aiding-and-abetting liability.
- The government appealed, arguing the indictment sufficiently alleged both principal and aiding-and-abetting liability and that factual disputes (e.g., what tasks the pharmacists performed and what they knew) precluded dismissal.
- The First Circuit reversed, holding the indictment tracked statutory elements, provided adequate factual detail, and raised disputed facts for trial rather than dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the indictment sufficiently alleges defendants "dispensed" misbranded drugs under the FFDCA | Indictment tracks statutory language and alleges acts (approving shipments tied to fake prescriptions) sufficient to charge "dispensing" | Defendants say they only performed clerical/packing tasks (checking addresses) and thus did not "dispense" | Reversed dismissal; indictment adequate to allege dispensing — factual disputes go to trial |
| Whether the FFDCA is unconstitutionally vague as applied | Statute is clear enough; indictment gave fair notice of charges | Statute is vague as applied to pharmacists performing packing/checking tasks | Rejected vagueness challenge; issue depends on contested facts and not appropriate to resolve pretrial |
| Whether aiding-and-abetting liability is adequately pleaded | Indictment and citation to 18 U.S.C. § 2 plus factual allegations show culpable participation beyond mere presence | Defendants argue allegations show mere presence or clerical involvement insufficient for aiding-and-abetting | Reversed dismissal; allegations permit a common-sense inference of knowing assistance — disputed facts for trial |
| Whether dismissal appropriate on pretrial motion given the record | Government: indictment meets Rule 7 and constitutional notice requirements; may rely on aiding-and-abetting theory | Defendants: technical reading of "dispense" and reliance on assumed facts justify dismissal | Court: dismissal improper; indictment sufficient and disputed factual issues bar pretrial resolution |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Guerrier, 669 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011) (standard of review and indictment sufficiency principles)
- United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (pleading facts assumed true on pretrial dismissal motions)
- Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (indictment tracking statutory language can be sufficient)
- United States v. Covington, 395 U.S. 57 (1969) (disputed facts prevent pretrial resolution of indictment validity)
- Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014) (scope of aiding-and-abetting liability and forms of assistance)
- Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993) (Congressional use of broad language in complicity contexts)