United States v. Stacy Harden, Jr., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13458

Defendant Stacy Lee Harden pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine pursuant to a written plea agreement that waived most appeals; the agreement and parties consented to a magistrate judge conducting the Rule 11 plea colloquy.
The magistrate judge, under the district court’s Local Rule 72.1(b), conducted the plea colloquy, asked for Harden’s consent, and stated he would accept the plea; no party contends the colloquy’s substantive content was defective.
After a presentence report, the district court held sentencing, made adverse findings, and imposed a within-guidelines sentence. Harden appealed, challenging the magistrate judge’s acceptance of his felony guilty plea.
The central legal question was whether the Federal Magistrates Act (§ 636) permits a magistrate judge, even with the parties’ consent, to accept a guilty plea in a felony case (i.e., adjudge guilt) rather than merely take a plea for the purpose of a report and recommendation.
The Seventh Circuit held the magistrate’s acceptance of Harden’s felony plea exceeded the authority granted by § 636(b)(3) because accepting a felony guilty plea is a duty comparable in importance to presiding over a felony trial and is not an "additional duty" the statute permits magistrates to perform.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a magistrate judge may accept a felony guilty plea with parties' consent under the Federal Magistrates Act	Harden consented; Local Rule and written waiver authorized magistrate to accept plea	Government: consent and waiver preclude challenge; no prejudice shown	Held: No — § 636(b)(3) does not authorize magistrates to accept felony guilty pleas even with consent; magistrate’s acceptance violated the Act
Whether waiver/forfeiture bars review of an unauthorized magistrate act	Harden knowingly consented in writing and at colloquy; so no error	Government contends waiver/forfeiture forecloses relief absent prejudice	Held: Consent/waiver not dispositive; courts may review statutory-authority defects despite consent and lack of prejudice
Whether acceptance of plea is comparable to duties permitted for magistrates (Peretz test)	N/A (dispute over scope)	N/A	Held: Acceptance of a felony plea is of greater importance than listed magistrate duties and not comparable to those tasks; Peretz does not authorize this delegation
Whether court must address constitutional Article III challenge	Harden raised constitutional claim that magistrate acting here violates Article III	Government did not prevail on statutory ground; constitutional claim presented	Held: Court did not decide Article III issue because statutory violation sufficed to reverse

Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991) (tests whether an unlisted magistrate duty is permissible by comparing responsibility and importance to listed duties)
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (guilty plea waives important constitutional rights; must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent)
Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69 (2003) (vacating judgments where tribunal lacked statutory authority despite lack of timely objection)
Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148 (2009) (automatic reversal may be required where judges lacked statutory authority to adjudicate)
Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989) (construes magistrate authority narrowly; express grants imply exclusions)
Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974) (reversal where magistrate performed duties not authorized by statute)
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (context on prevalence and importance of plea-based criminal justice)
Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 924 (1974) (acknowledges plea as waiver of constitutional rights)