United States v. Spoor
904 F.3d 141
| 2d Cir. | 2018Background
- Defendant Ronald T. Spoor was convicted after jury trial of two counts of production of child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2251) and four counts of possession of child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2252A), based on two videos recovered from hard drives: a 24‑minute "Camper Video" (two boys in an R/V; brief exposure of genitals) and a "Bathroom Video" (pinhole camera under a sink capturing boys urinating).
- Spoor admitted to a DHS agent that child pornography existed on his computers, that he was attracted to boys ~13, and that he made the videos (offering innocent explanations for their purpose).
- Prior to trial the Government gave Rule 414 notice seeking to introduce multiple prior‑act materials; the district court admitted a sanitized 2013 state conviction for Criminal Sexual Act in the First Degree but excluded other victim testimony and Spoor's inculpatory statements as unduly prejudicial.
- At trial the mothers testified about the childrens' approximate ages; the jury convicted on all counts. The district court calculated a Guidelines range of 360 months to life and sentenced Spoor to 360 months imprisonment and 15 years supervised release.
- Spoor appealed, challenging (1) sufficiency of the evidence that the videos were "lascivious exhibitions," (2) admission of the prior state conviction under Rule 414 (Rule 403 balance), and (3) substantive reasonableness of his 360‑month sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't) | Defendant's Argument (Spoor) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency: whether videos constituted "sexually explicit" (lascivious) conduct | Videos show nudity, focal exposure of genitals, sexually suggestive settings and camera placement — sufficient for a juror to find lascivious exhibition | Videos were nonlascivious/merely voyeuristic; lack of sexual acts, suggestive posing, or sustained focus on genitals undermines conviction | Affirmed: viewing evidence in Govt's favor, reasonable juror could find Dost factors satisfied and convict |
| Timing variance between indictment dates and trial evidence | Govt offered sufficient evidence that videos were made "in or about" charged dates; mothers' date estimates were not definitive and went to credibility | Alleged variance/constructive amendment because mothers described ages implying earlier dates (2010) than indicted (2012) | Affirmed: discrepancy was at most a nonprejudicial variance; defendant had notice of core criminality and was not misled |
| Admissibility of prior conviction under Rule 414 (and Rule 403) | Prior conviction probative of motive, intent (relevance to Dost factor 6), and to rebut defense that files belonged to someone else; district court limited prejudicial impact by admitting only sanitized conviction | Admission was unfairly prejudicial and not sufficiently necessary; Rule 403 should exclude it | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion in balancing probative value against prejudice and limiting other evidence |
| Substantive reasonableness of 360‑month sentence | Sentence within Guidelines; district court considered offense seriousness, pattern of abuse (including state conviction and admissions), need to protect public and Spoor's abuse‑of‑trust | Sentence a de facto life term excessive given Spoor's age, differences in degrees of repugnance among child‑pornography offenses; argued lower sentence (statutory minimum 15 years) sufficient | Affirmed: within broad discretion and inside Guidelines; sentence not substantively unreasonable given facts and public‑protection concerns |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245 (2d Cir.) (approving use of Dost factors)
- United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (formulation of factors for "lascivious exhibition")
- New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (protecting children from sexual exploitation justifies child pornography restrictions)
- United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010) (sentencing guidance and caution about Guidelines application in child‑pornography cases)
- United States v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519 (7th Cir.) (role of subjective intent limited in lasciviousness inquiry)
- United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28 (1st Cir.) (example of nonlascivious image and limits of Dost factors)
- United States v. Brown, 579 F.3d 672 (6th Cir.) (limitations on extrinsic evidence of intent)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (standard of appellate review for sentencing reasonableness)