63 F.4th 95
1st Cir.2023Background
- Spinks participated in a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and heroin in 2016–2017 and pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of conspiracy in July 2019.
- His plea agreement contained an appellate waiver: he waived appeal of his guilty plea and any sentence of imprisonment that does not exceed 125 months, with a narrow exception for newly recognized retroactive Supreme Court rights.
- At the change-of-plea hearing the district court confirmed Spinks had read, discussed, and understood the plea agreement and specifically explained the waiver and its effect; Spinks affirmed understanding.
- The PSR initially set a much higher guidelines range (capped at 240 months); Spinks objected to base offense level and criminal history treatment (seeking to treat a 2017 NY conviction as relevant conduct).
- The district court adjusted the offense level and criminal history, calculated an advisory guideline range of 92–115 months, and imposed a 115‑month sentence (below the 125‑month waiver cap).
- Spinks appealed, arguing (1) the appellate waiver does not bar a procedural-reasonableness challenge to the guidelines calculation and (2) alternatively the waiver was not entered knowingly so enforcing it would be a miscarriage of justice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the appellate waiver bars a procedural-reasonableness challenge to the district court's guidelines calculation | Spinks: waiver’s phrase "a sentence of imprisonment" is limited and does not bar challenges to the manner the sentence was determined (procedural challenges). | Government: waiving appeal of "a sentence" encompasses both procedural and substantive challenges to that sentence; waiver language is unambiguous. | The court held the waiver bars procedural and substantive challenges to the sentence; because the sentence was ≤125 months the appeal is barred. |
| Whether the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily entered (Teeter factors / miscarriage of justice) | Spinks: the court did not explain that the waiver would bar challenges to the guidelines-range calculation; thus assent was not fully informed and enforcement would be a miscarriage of justice. | Government: the plea colloquy, counsel’s role, and the court’s explanations satisfied Teeter; no requirement to "drill down" into every specific claim barred. | The court held the plea colloquy and waiver inquiry were adequate under Teeter and enforcement would not be a miscarriage of justice. |
| Whether a defendant can waive appeals of guideline calculations not yet determined at the plea | Spinks: he could not knowingly waive appellate review of a computation that did not yet exist. | Government: knowledge of the exact offense level or guidelines range is not a condition of a valid appellate waiver; defendant could have sought that information pre-plea. | The court held lack of pre-plea knowledge of the final guidelines range does not invalidate an otherwise unambiguous waiver. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Ubiles-Rosario, 867 F.3d 277 (summary of sources for plea-case facts)
- United States v. Santiago-Burgos, 750 F.3d 19 (contract-interpretation principles for plea waivers)
- United States v. McCoy, 508 F.3d 74 (appeal waiver precludes only appeals within its scope)
- United States v. Miranda-Díaz, 942 F.3d 33 (two-step sentencing review: procedural then substantive)
- United States v. Edelen, 539 F.3d 83 (unknown guideline-applicability does not invalidate waiver)
- United States v. Donath, 616 F.3d 80 (defendant could have sought probation-office treatment before pleading)
- United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14 (framework for assessing validity of appellate waivers)
- United States v. Staveley, 43 F.4th 9 (no requirement that district court detail every claim barred by a waiver)
- United States v. Arroyo-Blas, 783 F.3d 361 (courts will not conjure ambiguities in plea agreements)