United States v. Spicer, 2013 CAAF LEXIS 130

Spicer was convicted by general court-martial of two specifications of false official statements (Art. 107) and two specifications of child endangerment (Art. 134); sentence included dishonorable discharge, 10 years’ confinement, forfeiture, and reduction to E-1.
From June 17 to July 24, 2008, Spicer left his infant and toddler unattended at Fort Carson; the children were malnourished and the infant had diaper rash.
On July 24, 2008, Spicer claimed to police that a babysitter kidnapped his child; he later contradicted this during questioning, telling investigators a drug dealer abducted the child and fabricated the babysitter story.
CID/CSPD conducted a joint on-base/off-base investigation; Spicer ultimately admitted fabricating the stories on July 30, 2008.
The central issue is whether the statements to civilian police were “official” statements under Article 107, UCMJ; the court concluded they were not, reversing as to Charge I and remanding for sentence reassessment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the statements were “official” under Article 107, UCMJ.	Government argued the statements affected military functions and could be official.	Spicer argued the statements were not in the line of duty and not made to hearers performing military functions.	Not official; statements were to civilian officers not performing military functions at the time.

United States v. Day, 66 M.J. 172 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (framework for evaluating sufficiency and scope of official statements under Article 107)
United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 476 (1984) (definition of jurisdiction and official functions in evaluating official statements)
United States v. Teffeau, 58 M.J. 62 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (discussion of breadth of Article 107’s reach)
United States v. Jackson, 26 M.J. 377 (C.M.A. 1988) (predecessor analysis of officialness under Article 107)
United States v. Cummings, 3 M.J. 246 (C.M.A. 1977) (example of when hearer’s military function affects officialness)