United States v. Spencer
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16129
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- March 20, 2013: undercover BPD officer Casallas purchased crack from Michael Morrison while Spencer allegedly "stood watch;" Spencer arrested May 26, 2013. Federal indictment charged possession with intent and conspiracy; convicted after retrial and sentenced to 60 months.
- Lab chemist Claire Rimkus produced two drug-analysis certificates: one dated Sept. 26, 2013 listing incident date May 26, 2013 (incorrect), and a corrected certificate dated April 4, 2014 listing March 20, 2013. Both bore the same BPD control number.
- At trial defense highlighted the discrepancy to attack chain of custody; jury convicted. After conviction Spencer filed a pro se motion for a new trial alleging Brady nondisclosure (prosecutor’s contacts with Rimkus and a State Police lab call log).
- District Court convened evidentiary hearings, found the government had failed to produce the lab call log and evidence of AUSA communications (thus favorable and suppressed), but concluded nondisclosure was not material because the BPD control number tied the tested sample to the March 20 purchase.
- Spencer also challenged admission of police lay-opinion testimony, certain prosecutor statements at argument, and denial of discovery on a vindictive-prosecution claim; the court rejected each challenge and the First Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brady materiality of withheld lab call log and AUSA communications | Withheld evidence showing prosecutor prompted correction would have impeached Rimkus, cast doubt on chain of custody, and created reasonable probability of different result | Control number and corroborating BPD/agent testimony tied the tested sample to the March 20 purchase; undisclosed evidence at most speculative impeachment | Denied new trial: withheld evidence was favorable and suppressed, but not material because control number and other corroboration preserved confidence in verdict |
| Admissibility of police testimony describing drug-dealing patterns ("on," "counter-surveillance," tandem dealers) | Testimony improperly offered as expert opinion and was unduly prejudicial under Rule 403 | Testimony was lay opinion under Rule 701, rooted in officers’ personal experience and helpful to jury | Admission affirmed: testimony admissible as lay opinion and not an abuse of discretion |
| Prosecutor’s repeated references to defendant as a "drug dealer" in argument | Remarks suggested propensity and unfairly prejudiced jury | Remarks were inference from evidence; no contemporaneous objection; jury instructions cured any harm | No plain error: defendant failed to show prejudice or that fairness of proceedings was impaired |
| Denial of discovery on vindictive-prosecution claim | Spencer proffered prior civil suit vs. officer and alleged selective targeting plus Brady misconduct to obtain discovery | Defendant must show some evidence of vindictiveness tied to charging decision; record lacked such a connection | Denial affirmed: Spencer’s allegations were speculative and insufficient to warrant discovery |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (government must disclose materially favorable evidence)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (three-prong Brady test: favorable, suppressed, prejudice/materiality)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality defined as reasonable probability that result would be different)
- Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885 (2017) (materiality standard described as undermining confidence in outcome)
- United States v. Flores-Rivera, 787 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015) (Brady review and when undisclosed evidence warrants new trial)
- United States v. Del-Valle, 566 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2009) (standards for newly discovered evidence/new trial motions)