United States v. Speed
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18478
| 7th Cir. | 2011Background
- Speed was involved in multiple crack cocaine transactions totaling 74.2 grams, leading to three felony counts: conspiracy to distribute over 50 grams, distribution over 50 grams, and possession with intent to distribute over five grams.
- Cunningham testified Speed fronted drugs and had an ongoing arrangement to be paid after sales, with Speed sometimes driving to meetings with Tison.
- Undercover agents documented purchases on August 20, September 12, and September 23, including a 60.9–gram sale that formed Counts 2 and parts of Count 1.
- A plan on October 10 involving marijuana-for-crack trades resulted in Speed’s admission that he dealt with Tison and that he had supplied drugs before, recorded by agents.
- Speed was arrested with 16.4 grams of crack in his possession; he had two prior state felony drug convictions, mandating a life sentence under the statute in effect at the time.
- Congress later enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which raised the threshold for a life sentence, prompting Speed to seek retroactive application and resentencing, while arguing constitutional violations based on equal protection and cruel-and-unusual punishment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy and distribution | Speed and Cunningham had an ongoing buyer-seller relationship, not a conspiracy. | Cunningham's testimony and Speed's October 10 statements show an agreement to distribute beyond mere buyer-seller activity. | Evidence sufficient to sustain both conspiracy and distribution convictions. |
| Retroactivity of the Fair Sentencing Act | FSA should apply retroactively to Speed's case. | FSA should apply retroactively to all unresolved cases as of its effective date. | FSA does not apply retroactively; savings statute prevents retroactive effect. |
| Eighth Amendment challenge to mandatory life sentence | Mandatory life for smaller quantities is cruel and unusual due to FSA change. | Enactment of FSA demonstrates evolving standards; preexisting penalties may violate today’s standards. | No Eighth Amendment violation; preexisting penalties with recidivism remain proportionate. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Aldridge, 642 F.3d 537 (7th Cir.2011) (sufficiency review standard: rational jury could find guilt)
- United States v. Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346 (7th Cir.1993) (conspiracy requires agreement to commit a crime beyond the sale itself)
- United States v. Suggs, 374 F.3d 508 (7th Cir.2004) (proof of agreement to distribute drugs among co-conspirators)
- United States v. Hatchett, 245 F.3d 625 (7th Cir.2001) (knowledge and intent to distribute required)
- United States v. Bell, 624 F.3d 803 (7th Cir.2010) (FSA retroactivity considered under savings statute)
- United States v. Fisher, 635 F.3d 336 (7th Cir.2011) (FSA retroactivity and savings statute discussed)
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (Eighth Amendment standards and humane treatment)
- San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (equal protection considerations in constitutional challenges)
- Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (three-strikes-like regimes upheld)
- United States v. Strahan, 565 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir.2009) (Eighth Amendment analysis for drug sentences)
- United States v. Nagel, 559 F.3d 756 (7th Cir.2009) (rational basis review in sentencing disparities)
- United States v. Goncalves, 642 F.3d 245 (1st Cir.2011) (inevitable disparity in penalties when law changes)
- United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 665 (7th Cir.2006) (credibility determinations for witness testimony)