United States v. Specialist CHRISTOPHER B. HUKILL, ARMY 20140939

Background

Appellant, Specialist Christopher B. Hukill, was convicted by a military judge at a general court-martial of one specification of rape and one specification of abusive sexual contact under Article 120, UCMJ.
Government moved in limine to admit the charged rape of HG as propensity evidence under Mil. R. Evid. 413 for the abusive sexual contact charge involving AB; the military judge granted the motion pretrial.
Appellant elected a bench trial (military judge alone). After hearing evidence, the military judge found appellant guilty of both specifications and sentenced him to a dishonorable discharge, seven years confinement, forfeitures, and reduction to E-1; the convening authority approved the sentence.
On appeal under Article 66, UCMJ, this court originally affirmed findings and sentence and summarily denied Grostefon matters; appellant sought reconsideration citing United States v. Hills.
The court granted leave to file supplemental Grostefon matters out of time, reconsidered, and addressed whether Hills required reversal where a military judge (not members) decided the case.
The court concluded any error in the earlier pretrial ruling admitting charged-offense propensity evidence was rendered moot by appellant’s bench-trial election and that any consideration by the military judge was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether admission of charged offenses as Mil. R. Evid. 413 propensity evidence requires reversal under Hills	Hills holds charged offenses cannot be admitted under M.R.E. 413 to prove propensity and such instructions risk violating due process	Admission here violated Hills and undermined presumption of innocence; warrants reversal	No reversal: bench-trial election made the pretrial ruling moot; any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
Whether a military judge could impermissibly apply a lower standard of proof when considering 413 evidence	Appellant contends the judge could have applied an impermissibly low standard similar to members in Hills	The military judge is presumed to know and follow the law; record shows government was held to proof beyond a reasonable doubt	Court finds no evidence the military judge applied a lesser standard; presumption of proper judicial application stands
Whether Grostefon matters filed late should be considered	Appellant sought leave to file supplemental Grostefon matters raising the Hills claim	Government opposed timeliness but court may grant leave for consideration	Court granted leave, considered the matters, but concluded they did not warrant relief
Whether the earlier in limine ruling required relief despite bench trial election	Appellant argues prior erroneous admission ruling tainted the entire proceeding	Election of bench trial cures member-instruction concerns from Hills; trial judge’s independent role prevents same prejudice	Court held the bench trial removed the Hills-based prejudice concern; findings and sentence affirmed

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Hills, 75 M.J. _ (C.A.A.F. 2016) (charged offenses cannot be admitted under M.R.E. 413 to prove propensity at members trials; instructions risk due process violations)
United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (discussing prejudice standards and due process in military trials)
United States v. Erickson, 65 M.J. 221 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (military judges are presumed to know and follow the law)
United States v. Mason, 45 M.J. 483 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (same presumption regarding military judges)