United States v. Specialist ALVIN S. BANKS
2016 CCA LEXIS 483
| A.C.C.A. | 2016Background
- Appellant (Spc. Alvin S. Banks) was convicted by an officer general court-martial of abusive sexual contact and violating a general order; sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, 30 days confinement, forfeitures, and reduction to E‑1; convening authority approved the sentence.
- Sentencing occurred 6 November 2013; appellant received the SJAR and authenticated record on 8 August 2014; defense submitted R.C.M. 1105 matters on 8 January 2015 (153 days after receipt).
- The parties disputed how much of the post-trial delay the government should be charged with: appellant calculated 440 days between sentence and action; government argued 281 days.
- Central legal question: how to treat defense delays in calculating presumptive unreasonable post-trial delay under United States v. Moreno (120‑day trigger), specifically whether time taken by defense beyond R.C.M. 1105 deadlines can be excluded.
- The court held findings affirmed but, because of excessive post-trial delay, affirmed only so much of the sentence as provided for the bad-conduct discharge and ordered restoration of other rights and property.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defense delay in submitting R.C.M. 1105 matters beyond statutory time should be excluded from Moreno calculation | Appellant: Whole 153‑day delay (and cumulative 440 days) counts toward government delay, triggering Moreno presumptions | Government: Only time beyond initial 10‑day period should be excluded; government calculates less charged delay (281 days) | Court: Only time excluded is a granted Article 60(b) 20‑day extension; any defense delay beyond authorized 30 days accrues to government delay for Moreno purposes (adopts appellant’s 440‑day calculation) |
| Whether excessive post‑trial delay violated due process / merits relief | Appellant: Delay was egregious and harmed public perception of military justice; seeks relief under Moreno | Government: Provided staffing/operational reasons and argued less attributable delay | Court: Delay was excessive but did not constitute a Due Process violation under Barker factors; nonetheless court provided sentence relief under Article 66(c) review (limited affirmed sentence to BCD only) |
| Whether defense counsel’s untimely R.C.M. 1105 submissions should be treated as forfeiture or trigger ineffective assistance review | Appellant: argued delay prejudicial; counsel acknowledged delay benefited counsel | Government: Historically argued defense responsibility for timeliness | Held: R.C.M. 1105 deadline is mandatory; failure may forfeit right to submit matters and may raise IAC issues; courts should confront potential IAC rather than routinely permit ultra vires extensions |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (established presumptive‑delay framework and Barker analysis for post‑trial delay)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (four‑factor speedy‑trial balancing test adopted for post‑trial delay)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- United States v. Gladue, 67 M.J. 311 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (distinguishing forfeiture from waiver in appellate rights analysis)