United States v. Snider, 180 F. Supp. 3d 780

Snider pleaded guilty (2007) to distributing cocaine; the purchaser (Kraig Crow) died August 21, 2006; toxicology showed cocaine and propoxyphene; autopsy listed cocaine overdose as cause of death.
Plea agreement and sentencing treated the case as a "death-results" § 841(b)(1)(C) case (base offense level 38); Snider received a joint-recommended 144-month sentence.
After sentencing, Supreme Court decided Burrage v. United States (2014), holding that § 841(b)(1)(C) requires that the distributed drug be the but-for cause of death, unless possibly multiple independently sufficient causes exist concurrently.
New medical developments (FDA withdrawal of propoxyphene in 2010) and expert reports raised the possibility that propoxyphene — not or not solely cocaine — could have caused or contributed to Crow’s death.
Snider filed a § 2255 motion arguing Burrage and new evidence establish he is actually innocent of distributing a drug that was the but-for cause of death; the government contended Snider waived collateral challenges in his plea and that cocaine alone was independently sufficient to cause death.
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found the cocaine level was independently sufficient to cause death beyond a reasonable doubt, denied § 2255 relief, but issued a certificate of appealability on the Burrage interpretation issue.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Snider)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether Snider validly waived his right to bring a § 2255 collateral attack	Waiver should not bar relief because Burrage created a new substantive right not existing at plea time	Waiver was knowing, voluntary, and broadly covered collateral attacks including § 2255	Waiver enforceable; plea expressly waived § 2255 except limited inapplicable exceptions
Whether Burrage’s but-for causation rule (and new propoxyphene evidence) renders Snider’s conviction unlawful	New evidence + Burrage show cocaine was not the but-for cause; Snider is actually innocent	Even under Burrage, cocaine was an independently sufficient cause of death; conviction stands	Evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt cocaine alone would have sufficed to kill Crow; conviction lawful
Whether Burrage announces a retroactive new rule that invalidates pleas/sentences	Burrage is a substantive rule applicable retroactively to collateral review (argued)	Government conceded timeliness but disputed that relief is warranted on the facts	Court did not resolve retroactivity; assumed Burrage standard but denied relief on the merits
Whether Snider meets standard for "actual innocence" entitling him to relief	New expert opinions and propoxyphene risks show he is probably innocent	Experts and facts show cocaine alone was fatal; Snider fails to prove probable innocence	Snider failed to meet the extraordinarily high standard for freestanding actual innocence

Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014) (§ 841(b)(1)(C) requires the drug distributed be the but-for cause of death unless possibly multiple independently sufficient causes exist)
United States v. Houston, 406 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (interpreting § 841(b)(1)(C) to require cause-in-fact)
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (standard for gateway actual innocence to overcome procedural bar: no reasonable juror would convict in light of new evidence)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for determining retroactive application of new rules on collateral review)
United States v. Medina-Carrasco, 806 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2015) (enforcing appeal waivers and treating plea agreements under contract principles)